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I. INTRODUCTION
N the commentary on the ramifications of the "check the box" regu-
lations, there is no mention of what I believe will turn out to be one
of the thornier sets of issues in partnership tax in the coming years.
These issues will be raised by the use of entities that are taxed as partner-
ships and, thus, as passive financial intermediaries. Loosely speaking, fi-
nancial intermediaries are in the business of investing other people's
money. Banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds all serve as finan-
cial intermediaries. Passive financial intermediaries do little more than
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hold financial contracts and distribute their returns among their stake-
holders. A passive financial intermediary does not "originate" the con-
tracts it holds (distinguishing it from a bank) and it does not actively
trade investments (distinguishing it from an investment company). The
most familiar type of passive financial intermediary is used to create
mortgage-backed securities and other forms of asset-backed securities,1
which has been one of the most important areas of development in finan-
cial markets in the last generation. 2 Passive financial intermediaries are
used for purposes other than securitization. Some of the more interesting
financial transactions in recent years place a passive intermediary be-
tween an issuer of a security and investors to yield tax, regulatory, or
accounting advantages. 3
The lack of attention paid to the use of entities that are taxed as part-
nerships as passive financial intermediaries is not surprising. Right now
these issues germinate mostly beneath the surface. While tax planners
who create asset-backed securities use intermediaries that are taxed as
partnerships 4 out of necessity when there is no more secure way to avoid
a corporate level tax on a securitization vehicle, 5 they are circumspect in
1. Any asset that has regular and fairly predictable cash flows is ripe for securitiza-
tion. Short-lived assets, such as credit card receivables, have been securitized using revolv-
ing pools. Public entities have securitized rights to tax receipts. Even predicted cash flows
from as-yet-unmade contracts, such as anticipated royalties from the sale of David Bowie's
future recordings, have been securitized. See Aaron Elstein, If It Moves, David Pullman
Might Securitize It, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 1997, at 7.
2. Securitization is attractive to firms holding cash-generating assets because it can
lower their cost of financing and improve their financial appearance by moving liabilities
off book. The development of mortgage pools has had profound effects on the structure of
the mortgage industry and on financial markets. Once, banks were in the business of both
making and investing in mortgages; today those functions are often separate. Out of mort-
gage pools have been carved an array of securities with peculiar payoff and risks and oddly
poetic names, including Z-bonds, PACS, TACS, jump Zs, 10 and PO strips, floaters and
inverse floaters, and super-floaters and super-inverse floaters. See Joseph G. Haubrich,
Derivative Mechanisms: The CMO, ECON. COMMENTARY, Sept. 1, 1995, at 1. This process
of slicing cash flows and risks has been described as "financial alchemy." The sum of the
parts is worth more than the whole because different investors will pay a premium for a
security with risks and cash flows that is tailored to their specific wants. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 142-43
(1994).
3. A passive intermediary was used as an integral element in a plan to spawn a new
class of securities known by the tax-delectable oxymoron "tax-deductible preferred stock."
Basically, a corporation sold its long-term debt to a specially created partnership that
raised the funds to purchase the debt by issuing preferred interests. The end result was a
form of financing that was treated as equity for accounting purposes and as debt for tax
purposes. See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Dynamics of Securities Innovation
and Tax Law in the United States, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming).
4. These include state law trusts that are taxable as partnerships, LLCs, limited part-
nerships, and partnerships. For the sake of brevity, I will use the term "partnership" to
refer to this entire class of entities.
5. Historically, tax planners utilized grantor trusts that were structured to qualify as
partnerships if they failed to qualify as a grantor trust. See William A. Schmalzl et al., Tax
Issues, in SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 10.02B[e] (1997). The authors cite five
post-1993 offerings that use an "owner trust" that is structured to qualify as a partnership.
See id. § 10.02B[f][iv] n.73. Recent offerings using LLCs include MassMutual High Yield
Partners LLC (collateralized loan obligations), Triad Park LLC (real estate), and Nellie
Mae Education Funding LLC (student loans). See Smith-Barney Prices Nellie Mae Deal
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doing so, and do not seek tax advantages other than avoiding an entity
level tax on the intermediary. The use of partnerships as financial in-
termediaries involves sophisticated transactions and occurs at the nexus
of several complex bodies of tax rules, including the publicly traded part-
nership rules, 6 the REMIC7 and FASIT 8 rules (these are the two tax re-
gimes created for entities issuing asset-backed securities), the variable
rate debt instrument 9 and contingent payment debt instruments rules, 10
and, as this Article will address, several anti-abuse and anti-arbitrage
rules located both inside and outside of Subchapter K.
The "check the box" regulation," the most celebrated recent develop-
ment in partnership tax, and the subject of this symposium, is relevant to
this story, for it eliminates one impediment to the use of partnerships as
passive financial intermediaries. While it was possible even before the
regulation 12 to structure an intermediary to avoid corporate classification
without sacrificing the crucial features of public trading, limited liability,
and centralized management, doing so required some contortions and left
tax planners feeling exposed (even a little uncertainty regarding an im-
portant issue such as partnership classification can kill a public offering of
a security). The "check the box" regulation eliminates uncertainty on
classification. Other impediments to the use of partnerships as financial
intermediaries remain. One of these is uncertainty regarding key ele-
ments of the publicly traded partnership rules. This impediment is likely
to be short-lived, for the Treasury has promised to issue regulations clari-
fying these rules. There are other impediments to using partnerships, in-
cluding: the complexity of partnership tax law; restrictions on the
purchase by some institutional investors of equity securities including
partnership interests;' 3 dislike by individual investors of the partnership
return; l4 and a "marketing taint" carried by partnerships.' 5 These imped-
Featuring An LCC-Based Structure, THE BOND BUYER, July 10, 1996, at 2. Municipal
bonds are often held through entities that are taxed as partnerships. See George G. Wolf
et al., Certain Legal Aspects of Secondary Market Municipal Derivative Products, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1629, 1672-74 (1994). The Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has reported to the author that in the 1994 return year (the most recent year for which
information was available), 506 partnership returns checked line 7, indicating they were
publicly traded, with 161 of these being general partnerships, 277 being limited partner-
ships, and 68 being LLCs.
6. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994). For a good introduction to § 7704, see Schmalzl et al.,
supra note 5, § 10.02[B][1][e] and [f][iv].
7. See I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (West Supp. 1997).
8. See I.R.C. §§ 860H-860L (West Supp. 1997).
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5 (as amended in 1996).
10. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (1996).
11. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1996).
12. See Schmalzl et al., supra note 5.
13. See Arthur-M. Miller, Statement to Accompany Proposed TEMIC Legislation, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, Jan. 6, 1994, at 35.
14. Merrill Lynch created TOPRS (Trust Originated Preferred Securities) that used a
trust as intermediary in MIPS structure rather than a partnership so that investors would
receive a Form 1099 rather than a K-1.
15. See Thomas Humphreys, Current Developments in Taxation Law, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 25, 1992, at 8A. "As LLCs become more accepted, I think you'll see more asset
1997]
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iments melt away if the tax or other benefits to using partnerships as pas-
sive financial intermediaries are substantial enough.
My major goal in this Article is to revisit an argument I made several
years ago that partnerships should not be allowed to make special alloca-
tions. 16 Part II addresses some preliminary issues regarding the scope of
the "passive-type" income exception to the publicly traded partnership
rules. Part III takes a first cut at the problem of tax alchemy through
special allocations by comparing how well the special allocation rules and
the REMIC and FASIT rules do in preventing the creation of securities
that predictably bear deferred income out of a pool of debt instruments.
The comparison is apt, for a partnership that could not make special allo-
cations would look something like a REMIC and a FASIT because these
entities can have only one class of "pass-through" equity. They may have
multiple classes of debt. This comparison is not only of academic interest,
for as the law now stands, tax planners may elect between the FASIT
rules and Subchapter K in securitizing non-mortgage debt. The REMIC
and FASIT rules afford planners enormous flexibility in allocating risks
and cash flows in an entity while making it very difficult to structure se-
curities to predictably bear deferred income.17 If one takes the partner-
ship special allocation rules at face value, it is fairly easy to structure
partnership-holding debt instruments so that some securities issued by
the partnership will predictably bear deferred income. The caveat is im-
portant because it is clear that the rules in Subchapter K cannot be taken
at face value in this area. The government has shown a willingness to
securitization being done in the LLC format.... [T]he LLC is not a partnership, which has
a bad marketing taint. That's the reason we use trusts all the time." Id.
16. See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L.
REV. 1 (1990).
17. In this Article, I do not try to justify the proposition that the creation of interests
that predictably bear tax-deferred income is a bad thing. This is a form of something I
describe as tax alchemy, by which I mean the carving up of interests in a pool of securities
in a way that increases the aggregate value of the pool because of the tax attributes of the
interests. Sometimes this increase in value is captured by the issuer since the securities
command a higher price. Sometimes it is captured by the investor. Often tax alchemy
occurs because different tax clienteles place a premium value on interests with different
characteristics, though, as you will see, tax alchemy can occur without the existence of
different tax clienteles.
The argument for why tax alchemy is a bad thing is fairly straightforward on the surface.
To the extent the issuer captures this value, tax law may have a non-neutral effect on
intermediation decisions, including both decisions about what assets to hold through in-
termediaries and decisions about how to structure an intermediary. An issuer may also
reap a windfall at the expense of the Treasury (i.e., the American people) to the extent it
reaps a tax-driven premium price on a securities offering without sacrificing other things it
values. To the extent an investor captures this value, then tax law may have a non-neutral
effect on the investor's portfolio choices regarding the timing of cash flows and risks, or, to
the extent an investor can hold an interest with a premium after-tax return without sacrific-
ing other things she values, she reaps a windfall at the expense of the Treasury. There are,
in addition, the inevitable dead weight losses in the form of resources committed to plan-
ning and squabbling with the government over tax-saving strategies. If we dig beneath the
surface, then the policy issue often turns out to be more difficult than just stated because
tax-saving strategies may diminish the effect of non-neutral tax rules. This and other policy
issues are addressed in Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 3.
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stretch the law-perhaps beyond the breaking point-to rein in exotic
uses of partnerships.
Part IV pushes the analysis a little deeper by considering how a FASIT-
like tax regime and Subchapter K function if debt-like assets that yield
tax preference income are held through a passive intermediary. The par-
ticular examples I use are preferred stock and tax-exempt bonds. The
FASIT model does not work for such assets because it has the effect of
stripping away the tax preference from the income flowing through the
intermediary. Use of a partnership with no debt in its capital structure
avoids this problem, but it leads to another set of problems from the
Treasury's perspective, for the special allocation rules (again, if taken at
face value) enable tax planners to use partnerships as intermediaries to
circumvent rules on dividend-stripping and other provisions of tax law.
Part V takes up where the analysis in Parts III and IV leave off. After
explaining in general terms why passing the substantiality test ought to be
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for taxing an arrangement on a
"pass-through" basis, I turn to other anti-abuse rules. In particular, I ex-
amine the section 701 regulations and recent rulings under section 7701(l)
on "conduit financing arrangements." I argue that anti-abuse law could
and should be stretched to cover the use of partnerships to circumvent
other provisions in tax law, and that recent rulings under section 7701(1)
have begun to tighten up anti-abuse law by formulating "middle-range"
principles that cover reasonably well defined categories of cases. This
tightening strengthens anti-abuse law, but it also limits its potential reach,
thus establishing that there are some issues that cannot be addressed
through anti-abuse law. Thus, my ultimate conclusion is that Subchapter
K is not a suitable framework for taxing passive financial intermediaries.
II. OVERVIEW OF TAX LAW GOVERNING PASSIVE
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Tax law governing financial intermediaries can be visualized as sets of
sometimes overlapping rule systems. The basic choices are between the
rule systems governing corporations, 18 partnerships, 19 investment trusts,20
and a number of special rule systems that apply to particular types of
financial intermediaries, including the Regulated Investment Company
(RIC) rules, designed with mutual funds in mind,21 the Real Estate In-
vestment Trust (REIT) rules,22 the Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduit (REMIC) rules, designed for mortgage pools, 23 and the Finan-
cial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT) rules, designed gener-
18. These are primarily found in Subchapter C. See I.R.C. §§ 301-368 (West Supp.
1997).
19. See Subchapter K, I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (West Supp. 1997).
20. See Subchapter J, I.R.C. §§ 641-692 (West Supp. 1997).
21. See I.R.C. §§ 851-855 (West Supp. 1997).
22. See I.R.C. §§ 856-860 (West Supp. 1997).
23. See I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (West Supp. 1997).
1997]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ally for pools of debt-backed securities. 24 In addition, there are special
rules that apply to insurance companies,2s banks, 26 and securities broker-
dealers.27 Which rule system (or systems) covers an entity depends upon
the character of the assets it holds, what activities it performs, its capital
structure, and whether interests in it are publicly traded.
This Article focuses on entities with publicly traded interests and
"multi-class" capital structures that passively hold investment assets.
Generally, an entity is considered to be "publicly traded" if its equity
interests are traded on an established exchange or are readily tradable on
a secondary market.28 An entity is considered to have a multi-class capi-
tal structure if it has more than one class of equity interest. A "single-
class" entity may issue multiple classes of debt interests. Tax planners
tend to be ultra-cautious in dealing with classification issues, so if they
plan to use an entity that by law may have only a single-class of equity,
such as an investment trust, they will not create debt interests that argua-
bly could be classified as equity under general tax principles. 29 These
restrictions allow us to put aside the rules on investment trusts, for an
investment trust generally cannot have more than one class of equity in-
terest.30 And we can put to the side the rules on RICs (i.e., mutual
funds), 31 insurance companies, banks, and securities broker-dealers, for
these rules apply to different types of active financial intermediaries.
This narrowing of focus brings to the fore the rules on publicly traded
partnerships, 32 which tax partnerships with publicly traded interests as
corporations. More to the point, it brings to the fore an exception in
those rules for partnerships with "passive-type" income,33 because a pub-
licly traded partnership will come within Subchapter K if it comes within
this exception.34 The REMIC and FASIT rules remain very much in the
24. See I.R.C. §§ 860H-860L (West Supp. 1997).
25. See Subchapter L, I.R.C. §§ 801-848 (West Supp. 1997).
26. See Subchapter H, I.R.C. §§ 581-597 (West Supp. 1997).
27. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring securities dealers to use mark-
to-market on securities not held for investment and debt securities not held for sale).
28. Regulations issued under the publicly traded partnership rules amplify this defini-
tion. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1 (1997).
29. Reportedly, tax counsel will opine in a public offering that a security that is for-
mally denominated as equity will be treated as debt for tax purposes only if it has a high
investment grade rating of "A" or better. It has been argued that this standard effectively
precludes the creation of trust structures in securitizations of commercial receivables that
have large subordinated interests that bear significant default risk. See Statement of Don-
ald B. Susswein to House Ways and Means Committee on the FASIT legislation, July 27,
1995, reprinted in Coalition Counsel's Testimony in Support of FASIT Bill, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 2, 1995, at 106.
30. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (as amended in 1996).
31. RICs are also restricted in their ability to have multiple classes of interests. See
Rev. Rul. 89-81, 1989-1 C.B. 226 (requiring that tax-exempt income be allocated pro rata
among dividends paid on different RIC classes).
32. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994).
33. See I.R.C. § 7704(c) (1994).
34. A partnership must clear two bars to come within the "passive-type" income ex-
ception to the publicly traded partnership rules. First, 90% of the gross income of the
partnership must be "passive-type" income, or, in further Code-speak, it must be "qualify-
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picture. These rules apply to passive financial intermediaries that hold
particular types of assets, respectively, mortgages and debt instruments
(including receivables). While REMICs and FASITs literally may have
only one class of equity interests (indeed, the equity interest in a FASIT
may be owned by only one person), these rules belong in this picture
because they have safe harbors that treat as debt instruments securities
issued by an entity that might arguably be classified as equity under gen-
eral tax principles.
Diagram I depicts the rough relationship among these rule sets.
DIAGRAM I
Publicly traded, multi-class passive financial intermediaries





ing income." I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (1994). The Treasury is presently considering the ques-
tions of what is qualifying income. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.7704-1, -2 (1997).
The definition of qualifying income includes ordinary income and capital gain from most
forms of investment assets, specifically debt instruments (so long as interest is not contin-
gent on any person's gross income or profits); preferred and common stock; foreign cur-
rency; many forms of derivatives on debt, stock, and foreign currency, including at least
options, futures, and forward contracts; interests in REMICs and FASITs (both regular
interests and residual interests); and real estate so long as it is not held for sale in the
ordinary course of business and it is not leased out on a basis where the rent is contingent
on any person's gross income or profits. See I.R.C. § 7704(d) (1994).
Second, the partnership cannot be a regulated investment company, which means that it
must be exempt from regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940. More pre-
cisely, the exception does not apply "to any partnership which would be described in sec-
tion 851(a) [of the Internal Revenue Code] if such partnership were a domestic
corporation." I.R.C. § 7704(c)(3) (1994). Section 851(a) applies to "any domestic corpora-
tion" that "is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, 15
U.S.C. H8 80a-1 to 80b-2, as a management company or unit investment trust." I.R.C.
§ 851(a)(1)(A) (1994). Section 851(a) also covers two classes of companies that are ex-
empt under the 1940 Act. Neither of these provisions is relevant here.
The Treasury has the power to extend the qualifying income exception to investment
companies that trade in commodities and some forms of commodity derivatives by regula-
tion. It has not done so yet. Such regulations may include "any partnership a principal
activity of which is the buying and selling of commodities (not described in section




As Diagram I shows, the class of entities covered by the REMIC rules
is almost entirely a subset of the class of entities covered by the FASIT
rules 3 5 which itself is almost entirely a subset of the class of entities that
qualify for the "passive-type" income exception to the publicly traded
partnership rules when the partnership form is used. 36 In other words,
most partnerships that qualify as a FASIT will also come within the "pas-
sive-type" income exception, which covers many types of investment as-
sets,37 but many partnerships that come within the "passive-type" income
35. The overlap is not perfect. A REMIC may hold a contingent payment debt instru-
ment that is secured by real property. See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (1994). A FASIT may
not hold a CPDI. See infra notes 38, 67, 68.
36. The "passive-type" income domain is not coextensive with the FASIT domain
along two lines. One difference involves derivative income. While it is clear that a FASIT
may enter into derivative contracts to hedge against its risk as obligor on the interests it
issues, it is unclear what derivative income will qualify under § 7704(d)(4). See infra note
43. A second difference involves income from the foreclosure of personal property, such as
automobiles. A FASIT is permitted to earn incidental income from foreclosure property.
Income from the sale or lease of personal property is not qualifying income. A publicly
traded partnership with such income will still come within the exception so long as it and
other forms of nonqualifying income are less than ten percent of the partnership's gross
income.
37. The rules defining "qualifying income" generally are drawn to distinguish income
derived in the conduct of an active trade or business from investment income. Thus, the
definition of qualifying income omits the most common forms of business income: service
income and income from the sale of inventory. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391 (I1), at 714
(1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378. "The purpose of distinguishing between
passive-type income and other income is to distinguish those partnerships that are engaged
in activities commonly considered as essentially no more than investments, and those activ-
ities more typically conducted in corporate form that are in the nature of active business
activities." Id. at 714. The additional bar for investment companies was included because
Congress wanted to retain the RIC rules as the exclusive pass-through tax regime for in-
vestment companies. See id. at 713-16. ("It is not intended to alter the requirements for
conduit tax treatment set forth in the present law applicable to regulated investment
companies.").
There is an important exception: income from the exploration, development, processing,
transportation, and marketing of mineral and natural resources is defined as qualifying
income under a special rule. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) (1994). This provision has been
held to cover aluminum smelting, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-38-016 (Sept. 22, 1995); saw milling,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-50-029 (Dec. 16, 1994), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-05-015 (Nov. 1, 1990); growing
and harvesting timber, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-38-028 (Nov. 24, 1989), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-05-015
(Nov. 24, 1990); the production of pulp for paper, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-08-035 (Oct. 1, 1993);
and the production of fertilizer, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-39-014 (June 28, 1993).
This provision is remarkable from a tax policy perspective because it opens the door for
the elimination of the corporate income tax on major sectors of the United States econ-
omy, including not just the oil industry and the timber industry, but also industries that
process natural resources into primary products, such as aluminum, steel, and power. In
1988, Congress closed the door it opened in 1987 somewhat by amending the statute to
limit the provision to depletable resources. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1) (1994) (especially the
last clause, which was added by TAMRA). Thus, the generation of electricity from coal is
covered but not hydro and solar generation. Further, there was a statement in the legisla-
tive history that the exception was never meant to apply to retail sales to end users. See
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, S. REP. No. 100-455 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515.
If requests for private letter rulings are indicative of developments, then the major oil
companies are beginning to take advantage of this opportunity by spinning off some of
their operations into limited partnerships. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-12-024 (Mar. 21, 1997)
(responding to request for private letter ruling by "a major integrated [oil production] and
marketing business" with domestic and international operations that wanted to spinoff por-
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exception will not qualify under the FASIT rules, which cover only enti-
ties that hold "debt instruments. ' 38 The REMIC domain is shaded be-
cause it is exclusive. A multi-class entity with substantial holdings in
mortgages is taxed as a corporation if it does not come under the REMIC
or FASIT rules. The FASIT rules are not exclusive. The noncorporate
area outside the "passive-type" income exception and the corporate area
are shaded to denote that an entity level tax applies.
Where an entity appears on this diagram is primarily a function of the
type of assets it holds. Diagram II shows the location of publicly traded
partnerships that hold four types of assets: debt-instruments other than
mortgages,39 preferred stock,40 common stock,41 and insurance contracts.
tions of its operations handling sales to governmental entities as a limited partnership with
publicly traded interests); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-39-011 (Sept. 27, 1996) (responding to request
regarding spinoff of pipeline operations into limited partnership); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-52-013
(Dec. 30, 1994) (responding to request regarding spinoff of storage business into limited
partnership).
Why the movement in this direction has not been more aggressive is an interesting ques-
tion about which I can only speculate. Companies that could eliminate the corporate in-
come tax by spinning off operations into partnerships or LLCs (or converting into LLCs
when they have no retail components) may be disinclined to do so for several reasons:
they may pay little corporate tax in any event; they may face a hefty "toll-charge" on the
change because they own a substantial amount of appreciated assets; they may face sub-
stantial nontax costs from fragmenting their operations; or perhaps it is just inertia.
38. See I.R.C. § 860L(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997). A FASIT may not hold debt instru-
ments that pay contingent interest. See id. (incorporating the limitation of I.R.C.
§ 860G(a)(1)(B)(i)). A FASIT may hold certain assets that are incidental to its debt hold-
ings, including cash and cash equivalents, foreclosure property, and contracts used to guar-
antee or hedge against risks borne by regular interest holders.
39. Interest is qualifying income. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(A) (West 1989 & Supp.
1997). And so too is gain from the sale of an instrument held for the production of interest
income. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(F) (West Supp. 1997). Interest cannot be contingent on
any person's gross income or profits. Section 7704(d)(2)(B) excludes interest that "would
be excluded from the term 'interest' under section 856(f)." I.R.C. § 7704(d)(2)(B) (West
Supp. 1997). Section 856(f) excludes from the definition of interest for purposes of the
REIT rules any amount that "depends in whole or in part on the income or profits of any
person." I.R.C. §8 856(f) (West Supp. 1997). An entity that holds debt instruments is
likely to come under the exception to the 1940 Act for issuers of asset-backed securities
and so clear that bar to the "passive-type" income exception.
40. Dividends are qualifying income. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(B) (West 1989 & Supp.
1997). And so too is gain from the sale of an instrument held for the production of divi-
dends. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(F) (West Supp. 1997).
41. Income from common stock, along with income from many other assets, is defined
as qualifying income by I.R.C. § 7704(d)(4) (West Supp. 1997), which covers "any income
which would qualify under section 851(b)(2) or 856(c)(2)." The reference is to the RIC
and REIT rules. Qualifying income for a RIC is
dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans (as defined in
section 512(a)(5)), and gains from the sale or other disposition of stock or
securities ... or foreign currencies, or other income (including but not lim-
ited to gains from options, futures, or forward contracts) derived with respect
to its business of investing in such stock, securities, or currencies,
I.R.C. § 851(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). The definition of "security" in the RIC rules is ex-
pansive. It is coextensive with the definition of security in the Investment Company Act of
1940. See Treas. Reg. § 1.851-3 (1997).
As securities law now stands, a widely-held entity that holds common stock will not
come within the "passive-type" income exception because it will trip over the bar for in-
vestment companies. The entity will not come under Rule 3a-7, the exception for asset-













Non-mortgage debt straddles the FASIT and "passive-type" income do-
mains because it may be held through an entity in either domain. Com-
mon stock straddles the "passive-type" income border and is starred
because the question of whether it may be held through an entity that
comes within the "passive-type" exception, and so is therefore taxed as a
partnership, is in the hands of the SEC.42 I will return to this point
shortly.
A. THE FINANCIAL BUSINESs EXCLUSION
An important legal question mark hangs over the use of partnerships as
financial intermediaries generally. 43 The publicly traded partnership
that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period .... 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-
7(b)(i) (1997).
42. Perpetual preferred stock is in the same category as common stock for this pur-
pose because by its terms it does not convert into cash within a finite time period. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(b)(1) (1997).
43. Another important unresolved question concerns when income from derivatives is
qualifying income. See Guidance Sought on Definition of Qualifying Income in Partnership
Regs., TAX NOTES TODAY, July 27, 1995, at 116-40 (requesting clarification of whether
income from swaps and other exotic derivatives was qualifying income). Section
7704(d)(4) defines as qualifying income "any income which would qualify under section
851(b)(2) or 856(c)(2)." I.R.C. § 7704(d)(4) (West Supp. 1997). Section 851(b)(2) lists,
among other things, "income (including but not limited to gains from options, futures, or
forward contracts) derived with respect to [the entity's] business of investing in such stock,
securities, or currencies." I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). Under section 851(b)(2), an entity may hold
equity, interest rate, and currency derivatives, but only as an adjunct to its principal hold-
ings in equity, debt instruments, and currency. There is a somewhat analogous restriction
on the ability of FASITs to take positions in derivatives. A FASIT may enter into deriva-
tives to hedge against its risks as obligor on interests that it issues. See I.R.C.
§ 860L(c)(1)(D)(ii). Looking at the FASIT rule for guidance, it seems uncontroversial that
a partnership that issues debt can enter into derivative contracts to hedge against the risk
that fluctuations in the returns on its principal assets will impair its ability to service the
debt. See I.R.C. § 860K. The principle underlying the FASIT rule seems to be that deriva-
tives are properly used to hedge against the risk that the entity will be unable to meet its
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rules exclude interest "derived in the conduct of a financial or insurance
business"' 44 from the definition of "passive-type" income.4 5 The legisla-
tive history provides little help in defining the scope of this exclusion. It
states in full:
interest income from the conduct of a banking business is not treated
as passive-type income, as deriving interest is an integral part of the
conduct of the business. Similarly, it is not intended that dividend
income derived in the ordinary conduct of a business in which divi-
dend income is an integral part (e.g., a securities broker/dealer) be
treated as passive-type income.4 6
This statement explains that the exclusion is not limited to interest in-
come (which is what the statute literally says), but that it applies as well
to dividend income and, presumably, other forms of income "derived in
the conduct of a financial business or insurance business. '47 However,
the legislative history tells us little about what constitutes the conduct of a
"financial business." It does explain that interest income earned by a
bank is not "passive-type" income, but it does not address the real ques-
tion posed by securitization, which is what specific functions performed
by a bank are part of the "financial business." The process of securitiza-
tion enables banks and other firms that provide financial services to spin
off some of their functions by securitizing the assets associated with the
performance of that function. Accordingly, banks have spun off the func-
tion of financing credit card debt by securitizing credit card receivables.
Looking to other parts of the legislative history reveals two criteria that
may be used in defining "non-passive type" activities in general and the
scope of the "financial business" exclusion in particular. One criterion is
tradition: the legislative history indicates that Congress thought it rele-
vant whether a function traditionally performed by an entity was subject
to corporate income tax. 48 The other criterion is risk: Congress thought
commitments on the debt-like interests it issues. Applying this principle in the partnership
context, it should permit the use of derivatives to hedge the risk of servicing "preferred"
equity interests in partnerships. A slightly broader principle underlies section 851(b)(2). It
permits a RIC to use derivatives to hedge against a risk of loss on its principal assets. See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON FINANCE, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986, 99th Cong. 381 (1987). The difference in the two principles is that a RIC need not
justify the hedge as necessary to meet commitments it has made on interests it has issued; it
is sufficient that the hedge be against a risk of loss.
44. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
45. See Michael L. Schler, Schler Says Proposed PTP Regs. Are Potentially disastrous
Asset-Backed Securities, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 24, 1995, at 166 (seeking guidance that
trust that holds a revolving pool of assets is not engaged in the financial business); see also
Joe Crouse, American Bankers Association Wants Guidance On Publicly Traded Partner-
ships, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 24, 1996, at 208 (seeking guidance that pool of credit card
receivables is not in the financial business).
46. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1068-69 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-
684.
47. Id.
48. The House Report justifies distinguishing between passive-type income and other
income on the ground that "purchasers of such partnership interests could in most cases
independently acquire such investments." Id. at 750. It goes on to justify the inclusion of
some forms of non-passive income in the definition of qualifying income with the state-
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it appropriate that some risky enterprises bore the corporate income
tax.49 The problem with these criteria is that they do not fit very well
with the lines actually drawn by the statute in defining "passive type"
investments, nor do they make much sense. When the publicly traded
partnership rules were enacted the securitization revolution was already
under way: assets that had traditionally been held by financial institu-
tions, such as credit card receivables, were spun off into vehicles that
were taxable as trusts or as partnerships. There is no reason to think that
Congress meant to halt this process of innovation. Risk is no better as a
criterion. Risk is difficult to square with the statute because some forms
of "passive type" investments are quite risky, real estate in particular
(though the treatment of real estate could be explained on grounds of
tradition), and also other instruments such as debt and high-yield
bonds.50 Nor is there any apparent policy reason to treat high risk enter-
prises differently from low risk enterprises. Risk is relevant in tax law to
the characterization of an interest in an enterprise as debt or equity,51 but
the issue here is classification of the enterprise. Non-risky enterprises can
be carved up in ways that create very risky interests. The exotic interests
carved out of mortgage pools are a case in point, and risky enterprises
can be carved up in ways that create some non-risky interests.
Despite the lack of useful guidance from the statute and the legislative
history, it is possible to sketch what are likely to be the broad contours of
the "financial business" exclusion. The Treasury would be on very weak
legal ground if it took the position that bearing interest rate risk, default
ment "the rationale relates to the traditional conduct of such activities in partnership form,
and the consequent reluctance to impose entity-level tax in such circumstances." Id.
49. The House Report justifies the exception for interest or rent that is contingent on
profits on the ground that it "involves a greater degree of risk, and also a greater potential
for gain, than fixed (or even a market-indexed) rate of interest or rent, and thus is more
properly regarded as from an underlying active business activity." Id. at 751. In justifying
risk as a criteria, one may draw an analogy to the FASIT rules on "high-yield interests." A
FASIT may issue a high-yield interest, but it is taxed in a manner similar to an ownership
interest, i.e., such an interest may only be held by a Subchapter C corporation and net
operating losses cannot be used to offset its income. See I.R.C. §§ 860J(a), 860K (West
Supp. 1997). A high yield interest is defined as an interest either that makes principal
contingent on a risk other than default, or that has a maturity greater than 30 years, or that
bears excessive interest, which is defined either as having a yield to maturity that exceeds
the applicable federal rate by more than five percent or as having an issue price that ex-
ceeds the stated principal amount by more than 125%. See I.R.C. § 860L(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)
(West Supp. 1997). The legislative report for the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996 states that the purpose of the rule is to preserve the "corporate tax on returns that
approach returns on equity." See S. REP. No., 104-281, at 126 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1944, 1600.
50. An argument for treating interest and rents differently from dividends and other
payments received on stock, which may be just as risky, is that the former are deductible by
the payor, while the latter are not. Profits from an active business passed from a corpora-
tion through a publicly traded partnership in the form of dividends or other distributions
bear an entity-level tax. If they pass through the partnership tax free, interest and rent
paid by a corporation would never bear an entity-level tax.
51. None of the standard justifications for the corporate income tax turn on the riski-
ness of corporate enterprise. For a good review of these justifications, see Rebecca S.




risk, or other forms of investment risk on loans constitutes the "conduct
of a financial business" for this interpretation of the exclusion consumes
the rule that interest income is "passive-type" income. By similar logic,
the incidental monitoring and enforcement of loans should not constitute
the conduct of a financial business.52 More generally, the performance of
labor incidental to holding an investment asset should not necessarily
take an entity outside the "passive-type" income exception. The per-
formance of labor in conjunction with the holding of rental real estate is
expressly permitted under the publicly traded partnership rules,53 and, by
analogy to the REMIC and FASIT rules, an entity that holds mortgages
or loans secured by property should be able to foreclose, operate, and sell
property when a loan is in default without being considered to engage a
financial business.54 On the other hand, the origination of loans does
constitute the "conduct of a financial business. ' 55 In addition, active
trading of investments is also likely to be deemed the conduct of a finan-
cial business,56 though such a rule would be redundant. A publicly traded
partnership that actively trades investments will be considered an invest-
ment company and so will not qualify for the "passive-type" income ex-
ception under a separate rule. 57
The implicit policy choice seems to preserve the corporate tax on serv-
icing functions performed through publicly traded entities in the financial
sector while foregoing the corporate tax on risk-bearing and capital-pro-
viding functions. It is not obvious that the line should be drawn there. If
we were to draw a similar line through the business of insurance (the
point is hypothetical because insurance premiums are not within the defi-
52. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
53. The statute incorporates the REIT definition of real property rents, § 7704(d)(3),
where allowance is expressly made for "charges for services customarily furnished or ren-
dered in connection with the rental of real property." See I.R.C. § 856(d)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1997).
54. In the absence of guidance, the tax bar has been cautious about pressing service
functions into securitization vehicles. I'pically, a securitization vehicle will have no em-
ployees; services are contracted out. Presumably, intensive monitoring and enforcement
activities will disqualify an entity; the income of a collection agency is not passive. A case
that may fall near the line is the securitization of large commercial loans as they can in-
volve considerable effort in monitoring and enforcement.
Yet another question is whether actions taken to replenish loans in a revolving pool of
contracts constitute the conduct of a "financial business." See Schler, supra note 45. Given
the enactment of the FASIT rules, which were intended to facilitate securitizations using
revolving pools, it would be very surprising if Treasury took a position that disqualified
revolving pools under the publicly traded partnership rules.
55. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-01-006 (Jan. 3, 1997) (holding that income from holding
mortgages is qualifying income where the partnership performs only incidental origination
functions).
56. The statement in the legislative history that a "securities broker/dealer" is engaged
in a financial business points in this direction. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 751 (1987).
57. Securities Rule 3a-7 prohibits speculative trading through three rules: an entity
can buy and sell assets only in accordance with the terms by which it is established; asset
purchases or sales cannot result in a downgrading of its fixed-income securities; and an
entity cannot buy and sell assets "for the primary purpose of recognizing gains and de-




nition of qualifying income), then the origination of insurance policies
and processing of claims would remain subject to the corporate income
tax, but the bearing of insurance risk-and in particular, the business of
reinsurance-could be spun off to entities that are not subject to the cor-
porate income tax.
There are no compelling policy arguments for drawing the line in any
particular place. Perhaps the major policy concern in this regard is the
potential revenue loss from the erosion of the corporate tax base. This
revenue loss is difficult to estimate because it depends on such variables
as the degree to which corporate spin-offs of certain financial assets into
non-corporate vehicles takes the place of debt-financing, as well as the
effective tax rate on these assets when they are held within a corpora-
tion.58 The matter of revenue loss to the side, it is not clear whether
inducing corporations to spin off assets and related functions is socially
harmful. Some changes in corporate capital structure induced by the rule
will be of only formal significance. For example, a corporation might
move assets off its books without meaningfully altering the claims of cred-
itors shareholders, or the incentives of corporate agents. In instances
where these changes in corporate capital structure have substantive ef-
fects, it is not clear whether they are positive or negative from a social
perspective. In the long run, these developments are likely to lead to
finer divisions of claims to cash flows (and risks) generated by firms, and
to the creation of new forms of securities, effects that entail both benefits
and costs. 59
B. THE SEC's ROLE AS GATEKEEPER TO SUBCHAPTER K
One of the key moments in the history of the development of tax law
on financial intermediaries came in 1986 when the Treasury ruled that an
investment trust with more than one class of equity interest was taxable
as a business association. 60 This ruling was hurriedly issued in response
to publicity about plans to use trusts to slice interests in common stock
into two securities: a right to dividends and a right to the sale price of the
58. It is not clear what the effective tax rates on the insurance and banking industries
are today. Data prior to the 1986 reforms can be found in Tax Analysts, Effective Corpo-
rate Tax Rates 1985, 86 TAX NOTES TODAY 141-43, microformed on 86 TAX NOTES Doc.
86-7410 (1986) (estimating 16.49% effective tax rate on U.S. income of national banks,
15.39% rate on U.S. income of states banks, 7.78% rate on U.S. income of mutuals, and
19.41% rate on U.S. income of insurance industry). Tax Analysts, Quantifying the Impact
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Effective Corporate Tax Rates, 86 TAX NOTES TODAY
2413, microformed on 86 TAX NOTES Doc. 86-7412 (1986), predicted that these rates
would be changed little by the 1986 Act. The most recent published data from corporate
tax returns shows that in the aggregate firms in the financial, insurance, and real estate
business paid $38,723,220,000 in corporate income tax in 1993. See Michael G. Seiders,
Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1993, 16 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 36, 48 (1996).
59. The case has be made that spinning off high-grade assets from firms with low credit
ratings yields informational benefits to investors and lenders. See Claire A. Hill, Securi-
tization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1086 (1996).
60. T.D. 8080, 1986-1 C.B. 371 (amending Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)). This story is
told in Douglas H. Walter & Paula A. Strasen, Innovative Transactions-The Americus
Trust "Prime" and "Score" Units, 65 TAXES 59 (1987).
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stock. The Treasury was justly worried about stock slicing; different tax
clienteles will pay a premium for different slices of common stock. 61
Given this history, one might be surprised to learn that today the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (SEC) has the power to decide whether part-
nerships that are used to hold common stock come under Subchapter K.
This odd state of affairs is due to the two requirements that a partner-
ship must meet to come within the "passive-type" income exception to
the publicly traded partnership rules: the income of the partnership must
be "qualifying income," which income from common stock is, and the
entity cannot be within the definition of an "investment company" under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act). 62 Congress in-
cluded the latter provision to preserve the exclusivity of the RIC regime
for mutual funds.63 The definition of an "investment company" is quite
broad: it covers any issuer of a security64 that is primarily engaged "in
the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities. '65 This def-
inition encompasses most publicly traded entities that have "passive-
type" income. While the overlap is not complete, however, it is substan-
tial. An entity that invests in real estate has qualifying income but is not
an investment company. The investment company bar does not swallow
the "passive-type" income exception because of exceptions within securi-
ties law to the definition of an investment company. The most important
of these exceptions in the securitization area is Rule 3a-7, which was is-
sued by the SEC in 1992 and provides that an issuer of asset-backed se-
curities is not an investment company.66 This rule was written in
expansive terms to allow for innovation.67
61. Tax-paying corporations might pay a premium for the right to the dividend stream.
Tax-paying persons might pay a premium for the right to appreciation because of income
deferral. And, there is a huge potential tax payoff if a slice can be created that is similar to
a zero-coupon bond but is not subject to the OID rules.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -3 (1994).
63. It is not intended to alter the requirements for conduit tax treatment set forth in
the present law applicable to regulated investment companies. Thus, the success of a
securitization transaction depends on the vehicle not being classified as an investment com-
pany. See Robert F. Hugi et al., Registration Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
in SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (1997).
64. The term "securities" includes notes, stocks, options, and debt instruments. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1994).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). The definition also includes a company that owns "in-
vestment securities" with a value exceeding 40% of the total value of its assets. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1994).
66. See Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financ-
ings, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1997)). Securitization
transactions prior to Rule 3a-7 proceeded under other exceptions, particularly those for
companies that purchase mortgages or financing instruments, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(5),
which permitted securitizations of mortgages, credit card receivables, and trade receiv-
ables, and an exception for "private investment companies," which covers non-public offer-
ings to fewer than 100 persons. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5) (1994).
67. The proposed version of Rule 3a-7 had a laundry list of eligible assets. See Exclu-
sion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financing, 57 Fed. Reg.
23,980, 23,985 (1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1997)). The final rule defines "eli-
gible assets" broadly as "financial assets . . . that by their terms convert into cash within a
finite time period." 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(b)(1) (1997). Rule 3a-7 also broadly defines per-
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In effect, the SEC serves as a gatekeeper to Subchapter K for partner-
ships that serve as passive financial intermediaries because of the
agency's power to define what is a regulated investment company. 68
Some restrictions imposed by the SEC have a great bearing on tax policy.
Because Rule 3a-7 covers only "financial assets ... that by their terms
convert into cash within a finite time period," 69 it is difficult to hold com-
mon stock through a widely traded partnership (other exceptions may
come into play if a partnership is not widely traded). Additionally, Rule
3a-7 requires that to come within the exception for asset-backed securi-
ties, interests sold by an intermediary to the general public must be high-
grade, fixed-income, or pay-through securities, which limits the ability of
tax planners to create publicly marketable interests that bear contingent
deferred income.70 If the SEC relaxed these restrictions, which is in its
power, then it would become possible to hold common stock through a
publicly traded partnership, and to create interests with back-end loaded
returns.
It is worrisome to have decisions with important tax policy ramifica-
tions made by the SEC because the agency has different regulatory objec-
tives than the Treasury. The SEC's objective is to protect investors; the
Treasury must protect the fisc. Inter-agency consultation might alleviate
this problem, but that seems not to have been the practice in the past.
The Treasury did not comment on Rule 3a-7, and there are no mecha-
nisms in place to ensure inter-Agency consultation in the future.
III. SECURITIZATION OF DEBT: WHY THE FASIT AND
REMIC RULES ARE SUPERIOR TO SUBCHAPTER K
A passive financial intermediary that holds debt (other than mort-
gages) may elect to operate either under the FASIT rules, now that those
rules are in effect, or under Subchapter K. This election is not available
to intermediaries that hold mortgages because Congress made the
REMIC and FASIT rules the exclusive regimes for securitizing mort-
gages. Congress did this through the rule on Taxable Mortgage Pools,
which taxes a multi-class entity that primarily holds mortgages as a corpo-
ration if it does not come under the REMIC or FASIT rules.71
missible interests as nonredeemable, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a), "fixed-income securities or
other securities which entitle their holders to receive payments that depend primarily on
the cash flow from eligible assets." 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a)(1) (1997).
68. Securities law imposes significant substantive restrictions on investment compa-
nies, including limitations on the ability of an entity to have multiple classes of interests.
Thus, for non-tax reasons, even more so than for tax reasons, the success of a securitization
transaction depends on the vehicle not being classified as an investment company. See
Hugi et al., supra note 63.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(b)(1) (1997).
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a)(1)-(2) (1997).
71. More precisely, the rules tax as a corporation any entity other than a REMIC or a
FASIT if "substantially all of the assets of such entity consists of debt obligations (or inter-
ests therein) and more than 50 percent of such debt obligations (or interests) consists of
real estate mortgages (or interests therein)," and "such entity is the obligor under debt
obligations with 2 or more maturities," and payments on the debt obligations issued by the
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How do the FASIT rules stack up against Subchapter K as a tax regime
for securitizing debt? One difference between the two regimes that is
often significant in tax planning has little bearing on the typical debt
securitization. Under the FASIT rules, gain (but not loss) is recognized
on a transfer of debt to the entity;72 under Subchapter K, neither gain nor
loss is recognized on a transfer of assets to a partnership if the transferor
retains an interest in the partnership. 73 This difference has little bearing
on a typical debt securitization because a transfer to a vehicle is likely to
be structured as a sale for accounting and legal reasons even in cases
where the transferor retains an ownership interest in the vehicle. Also,
typically the transferor will receive the proceeds from the public offering
upon the transfer of debt to the vehicle, which would bring into play the
rule on disguised sales to partnerships, 74 as well as other rules that apply
to "abnormal" partnership distributions,75 even were a transfer struc-
tured as a contribution rather than a sale. 76
A more significant difference between the two regimes lies in the dif-
ferent possibilities under the two for creating interests that predictably
bear deferred income. The most obvious way to do this is to strip interest
from the principal on a debt instrument. The goal is to create a secur-
ity-a "principal only," or "PO," interest-that is equivalent to a zero
coupon bond but that does not accrue interest under the OID rules. The
interest income attributable to the principal does not disappear; it is
shifted to the holders of the "interest only," or "1O," interest. There is a
potential for gain in income shifting because the 10 interest can be sold
to foreigners or tax-exempt entities who are indifferent to the extra taxa-
ble income.
The interest strip is an extreme example of income shifting. A similar
effect can be achieved by creating interests with inversely stepped interest
entity "bear a relationship" to payments on debt obligations held by the entity. I.R.C.
7701(i)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
72. See I.R.C. § 8601(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). Publicly traded partnerships might be
used for debt securitizations to get around two recognition provisions in the FASIT rules.
First, if the holder of an ownership interest in a FASIT pledges property to secure pay-
ments on a regular interest, then the FASIT rules require that the holder recognize gain on
that pledged property as soon as it "supports any regular interest in such FASIT." See
I.R.C. § 8601(b) (West Supp. 1997). Second, the FASIT rules require that non-publicly
traded debt be valued for purposes of computing gain by discounting "reasonably expected
payments" by 120% of the AFR. See I.R.C. § 8601(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
73. See I.R.C. § 721(a) (1994).
74. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (1994).
75. These include § 751, which treats a distribution that alters partners' relative inter-
est in ordinary income assets as a deemed sale, and § 737, which recognizes "precontribu-
tion gain" to the extent the value of assets distributed exceeds a partner's basis in its
interest. See I.R.C. §§ 751(b)(1), 737(a)(1) (1994).
76. Under § 721(b), gain also will be recognized on a transfer of property to a partner-
ship if the partnership would come within the definition of an investment company under
§ 351 were it a corporation. See I.R.C. § 721(b) (1994). A transfer is considered to be to
an investment company if the transfer results in diversification of the transferor's interests
and "more than 80 percent of the value of [the corporation's] assets (excluding cash and
nonconvertible debt obligations) are held for investment and are readily marketable stocks
or securities ..... Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1996).
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rates or claims on interest paid through the pool. One class (Class A)
would first pay an above-market interest rate 77 and later pay a below-
market rate. The other class (Class B) would initially pay a below-market
interest rate and later pay an above-market rate. The stepped rates could
be fixed or variable (e.g., Class A first pays LIBOR plus two percent and
later pays LIBOR minus four percent). The two classes could be struc-
tured with the same pre-tax expected yield on the date of issue. Were the
interest income to each class based on the stated interest, then this struc-
ture would temporarily shift taxable income to Class A from Class B.
The shift in taxable income to Class A is not matched by a corresponding
economic shift in the value of the interests because the below-market in-
terest rate in the later years suppresses the gain of Class A.
This sort of tax alchemy is impossible under the FASIT and REMIC
rules. A FASIT or REMIC must have two classes of interests: regular
interests, which must take the form of debt instruments; and an owner-
ship or residual interest, of which in a REMIC there can only be one
class 78 and in a FASIT there can be only one owner.79 Obviously, income
shifting is not possible within the ownership interest class.
In theory, income shifting might be possible within the regular interest
class, or across the regular and ownership interest classes, but two differ-
ent types of rules make it impossible. First, there are restrictions on the
form that regular interests may take; specifically, a regular interest may
not bear a stepped fixed or variable interest rate.80 Second, because reg-
ular interests are taxed as debt instruments, several bodies of rules that
are designed to tax debt instruments on their expected yield come into
play to ensure that a regular interest cannot predictably bear deferred
income. For example, the REMIC regulations permit a pool to have in-
terest-only and principal-only classes.81 For example, they permit interest
stripping, but the rules on bond premium and OlD ensure that each class
of interest is taxed on its expected yield.82 And even if a FASIT or
77. The market rate of interest for a given year is the forward interest for the year at
the date of issue.
78. See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
79. See I.R.C. § 860L(a)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997).
80. Stepped fixed rates run afoul of a statutory requirement that interest on a regular
interest must be payable "on a fixed rate" (note the singular) or a variable rate. See I.R.C.
§ 860G(a)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1997). Stepped variable rates run afoul of a regulatory
requirement that additions or subtractions to a variable rate must be constant over the life
of the instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-1(a)(3)(iii)(B) (as amended in 1995).
81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-1(a)(2)(C)(iv) (as amended in 1995).
82. Bond premium exists when the acquisition cost of a bond exceeds its principal
amount, which is true in spades of an 10 security since the principal amount is zero. The
holder amortizes this premium over the life of the bond, reducing his interest income. See
I.R.C. § 171(E) (1994). This calculation can be made for a mortgage-backed security along
the same lines as the calculation of original issue discount. See DAVID GARLOCK, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS ch. 16.6 (3d ed. 1994). The issuer of an
10 security will treat the amount it pays on the security correspondingly as interest and
principal. A holder of a PO security will calculate interest under the OID rules because
the stated principal amount of the security exceeds the issue price. Special OlD rules ap-
ply to REMICs that produce a result that in certain respects is closer to a mark-to-market
method than to a pure expected-yield method. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6) (1994). Under an
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REMIC could have classes of regular interests with stepped rates (again
they cannot) the rules on Variable Rate Debt Instruments and Contin-
gent Rate Debt Instruments would come into play to ensure that each
class would be taxed on its expected yield.83 The possibility remains that
an ownership interest could predictably bear deferred income since it is
taxed on a flow-through basis and not an expected-yield basis. However,
for a reason that will be explained shortly, ownership interests usually
have the opposite characteristic-they predictably bear taxable income in
excess of economic income.
If one took the rules in Subchapter K at face value, then it would be
fairly easy to create interests in a pool of debt instruments that predict-
ably bear deferred income. Subchapter K imposes no restrictions on the
capital structure of a partnership other than a requirement that income or
loss allocated to a partner be reflected in the partner's capital account
and that balances in capital accounts be respected on liquidation. 84 This
rule does not prevent income shifting because offsetting allocations can
be made over time. To take a simple example, consistent with the appli-
cation of this rule, interest income could be allocated to Class A interests
expected-yield method, income is imputed on an investment based on the expected yield
when the investment is made without regard to the actual yield. Assume a five-year $1,000
zero-coupon bond that pays $1,000 multiplied by one plus the rate of increase in the price
of gold in five years. The expected yield on the bond is a function of the five-year forward
price of gold when the bond is acquired. Interest accrued on the bond will not fluctuate
with the forward price of gold. Under a special rule that applies to regular interests in
REMICs and other debt instruments subject to prepayment risk, OID is calculated for
each period by determining the present value of the remaining payments at the end of the
period, adding payments of principal during the period, and subtracting the issue price at
the beginning of the period. The effect is that variations as the mortgage prepayment rate
will be accounted for in income as they occur. This can have a dramatic effect on the
interest calculation on an 1O security since unexpected principal prepayments can devas-
tate its present value. The method does not produce a result equivalent to mark-to-mar-
ket. Events other than prepayment are not taken into account (though the statute enables
the Treasury to cover other events accelerating payment). See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(C))
(1994). And, the present value of the instrument is calculated using its original yield to
maturity. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(B)(i) (1994).
83. These rules require recalculation of interest in line with the true expected yield on
a debt instrument. For example, the Class B interest with stepped fixed rates would be
determined to bear original issue discount, with the consequence that interest would be
accrued on a constant yield method. This occurs because the step in the interest rate does
not come within the definition of "qualified stated interest." See Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)
(as amended in 1996) (requiring that QSI be paid "at a single fixed rate"). Thus, interest is
included in the stated redemption price at maturity for purposes of calculation of OID. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(4) (as amended in 1996). Arguably, the Class B interest with
stepped variable rates would be taxed as a Variable Rate Debt Instrument (VRDI). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5(a)(3)(i)(A) (as amended in 1996) (covering debt instruments with
"one or more qualified floating rates"). Accordingly, Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5(e)(3), which
covers VRDIs that have more than a single variable rate, would come into play to impute
interest using a constant yield method. Alternatively, the instrument might not qualify to
be taxed as a VRDI because it violates a requirement that additions or subtractions to a
variable rate must be constant over the life of the instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5(b)
(as amended in 1996) (defining a "qualified floating rate"); Treas. Reg. § 1275-5(d), ex. 2.
In this case, the rules on Contingent Interest Debt Instruments will apply, which means
that interest will be imputed using a constant yield method.
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1994).
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until the capital account attributable to an interest equals the amount due
the interest holder at maturity; thereafter, interest income would be allo-
cated to Class B interests. 85 This is called the "interest flip."
Until a few years ago, I would have thought that the principal test that
this arrangement would have to pass is the rule in the § 704(b) regula-
tions, which states that special allocations must have a "substantial" eco-
nomic effect.86 The principle of substantiality should suffice to deal with
the interest flip in a partnership that holds high-grade debt instruments.
However, it is a far weaker check than the principle that underlies the
FASIT and REMIC rules, which is that an interest should bear tax on its
expected yield whatever the pattern of cash flows or risks. The strongest
form of the substantiality test is met if there is a "strong likelihood that
the after-tax economic consequences" of any partner will "in present
value terms" be "substantially diminished" by an allocation.87 While allo-
cations that merely vary the timing of fairly certain cash flows to achieve
some tax advantage without altering the expected yield on interests
should not pass muster under this test, allocations that vary the timing of
cash flows and the risks borne by partners should pass muster even
though there is a tax benefit in the allocation.
Let me give you one example of a capital structure that I believe would
pass muster under the § 704-1(b) regulations where the partnership rules
yield very different tax results than the FASIT rules. The partnership
holds a portfolio of long-term debt instruments that pay a higher than-
market rate of interest but which are purchased at a significant discount
because of a significant risk of default. Notes of companies in distress
would do the trick. To keep it simple, assume the partnership has two
classes of interests (multiple tranches would work even better). Class A
is initially allocated all of the interest paid on the notes, which is distrib-
85. This arrangement mimics a similar arrangement using a REIT that the Treasury
condemned in I.R.S. Notice 97-21, 1997-11. I.R.B. 9. I am told that the. REIT structure
was used because it was thought that this arrangement would not pass muster under
§ 704(b).
86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1995).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a). This test is poorly drafted as a technical matter;
there is a crucial ambiguity. Is the test satisfied if there is substantial chance that the after-
tax payoff on an interest will be less than it would have been without the allocation on an
outcome or set of outcomes that have a meaningful chance of occurring? Or does the test
require that the after-tax expected yield on an interest be less than it would have been
without the allocation? I interpret the test in the first way because it says "strong likeli-
hood," which is outcome oriented, but the regulation is not entirely clear on this crucial
point for it also dictates that outcomes be assessed in "present value terms," which is for-
ward looking and might be stretched to cover discounting for risk. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iii)(a). Thus, a pattern of allocations that has a positive after-tax expected yield to
all classes will pass muster so long as there is a sufficient chance that the actual yield to one
class will be substantially less than it would have been without the allocation. There is no
guidance on how probable a loss outcome must be.
There are other technical problems. For instance, the test can be satisfied by creating a
risk-bearing interest, i.e., a structure will pass muster if it increases the after-tax expected
yield on some interests while not having adverse consequences to others, so long as at least
one partner might be adversely effected. Moreover, the test does not address the possibil-
ity that a partner who bears risk might hedge against that risk outside the partnership.
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uted currently, along with any losses from defaults. Class B is allocated
interest once losses allocated to Class A zero out the Class A capital ac-
count.88 These allocations have a substantial economic effect for varia-
tions in the default rate will significantly alter the returns to the two
classes. Under the normal rules of Subchapter K, holders of Class A in-
terests would have ordinary income and an offsetting capital loss. Hold-
ers of Class B would have a mixture of deferred interest income (once
Class A is paid out), ordinary income representing the market discount in
the bonds, and capital gain when the principal paid out through the pool
exceeds an investor's basis in its interest. Under the FASIT rules, each
class of interests would bear tax on its expected yield.
I am not saying that such a structure would in fact pass muster.89 While
88. A concrete example may help. The partnership buys a pool of 1,000 ten-year notes
each with a principal amount of $100 and bearing interest at 10%. The probability that a
note will default in any given year is 10%. The notes trade at a significant discount. The
risk-free interest is 5%, and the notes trade for $68.50. In year one, 100 notes default
producing a tax loss of $6,850 (100 times the purchase price of the note, $68.50) and inter-
est is paid on 900 notes. Class A zeros out in year seven with an initial investment of
$34,000, which is slightly more than the present value of the projected cash flows dis-
counted at a rate of 5%.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A income 9,000 8,100 7,290 6,560 5,322 3,017 955
loss 6,850 6,165 5,549 5,001 4,521 4,042 2,829
distribution 9,000 8,100 7,290 6,560 5,322 3,017 0
capital 34,000 27,150 20,985 15,436 10,436 5,915 1,873 0
account
B income 578 2,293 3,825 4,300 3,870 14,442
loss 802 3,288 2,946 2,672
distribution 578 2,293 4,780 4,300 3,870 38,280
capital 34,501 34,501 34,501 34,501 34,501 34,501 34,501 32,744 29,456 26,510 0
account
The deferral of income to Class B is a product of two effects. First, all market discount
income is allocated to Class B. Second, income is shifted from Class B to Class A in the
early years. The taxable income of Class A exceeds economic income (cash paid minus the
decrease in value of expected cash flows), as the following table shows:
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A taxable
income 2,150 1,935 1,741 1,559 801 (1,025) (1,873)
A economic
income 1,702 1,337 999 684 390 144 0
This second effect makes it possible to create interests that predictably bear deferred in-
come out of a pool of notes that do not trade at a discount. To do this requires a large pool
with multiple tranches using low-grade notes bearing a high rate of interest and a corre-
spondingly high expected rate of default. For example, in one simulation using ten-year
notes with a stated interest of 10% (the assumed risk-free rate of interest was 5%) and a
default rate of 4.5% per year, I created five equal size classes of interests with the slowest
paying class bearing no taxable income until year seven.
89. I.R.S. Notice 95-53, which was directed at lease strips and other stripping transac-
tions, identifies other rules and principles that the Treasury might bring to bear, including
§ 701 (the anti-abuse regulation), § 482 (which allows the Treasury to reallocate items in
transactions between related parties), § 446(b) (the clear reflection of income doctrine),
and a bevy of common law principles. See I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334, 335; I.R.C.
§ 446 (1994); I.R.C. § 701 (1994). The regulation proposed to deal with stripping transac-
tions is not relevant to this issue. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(1)-2, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,175
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it seems to me that this structure satisfies the § 704(b) regulations, events
of the last few years have shown that the government will not abide ex-
otic plans that exploit Subchapter K or other pass-through rule regimes to
create interests that predictably bear deferred income or have other dis-
turbing tax characteristics. In particular, the government is likely to ar-
gue that the structure described in the last paragraph is a conduit
financing arrangement. The government made this argument in two re-
cent rulings challenging well-publicized transactions that shifted income
or deductions between taxpayers by using financial intermediaries. 90 It
grounded these rulings on § 7701(l), which was enacted in 1993 and gives
the Commissioner broad authority to issue regulations dealing with "con-
duit. financing arrangements." 91 One of these rulings states a principle
broad enough to cover the structure described in the last paragraph. 92
Boiled down, this principle would recharacterize as a conduit financing
arrangement any partnership structure in which payments made to a part-
ner eroded the value of that partner's interest and the payments (with
associated allocations of income) shifted taxable income from one part-
ner to another.93 The structure described in the last paragraph runs afoul
of the principle if not the precise letter of this ruling because the alloca-
(1996). In the variant of a stripping transaction that uses a partnership, an entity that is
effectively tax exempt transfers rental or other property that generates income and ex-
pense to a partnership that involves some other entities that can make use of the deduc-
tions. The rent or other income is prepaid and that income is allocated to the transferor,
which then liquidates its interest in the partnership. The remaining partners then reap the
benefits of depreciation or other expenses of producing the income without being taxed on
the corresponding income. See I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334. The proposed regula-
tions apply if one party assumes the obligations of another party to provide property or
services in the future while the other party has already received, or retains the right to
receive, payments for providing such property or services. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.770(l)-
2, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,175, 68,176 (1996).
90. See I.R.S. Notice 97-21, 1997-11 I.R.B. 9 (responding to "fast-pay preferred
stock"); I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334 (responding to stripping transactions). Notice
95-53 is discussed at supra note 89.
91. Section 7701(1) gives the Secretary of Treasury authority to "prescribe regulations
recharacterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction directly among
any 2 or more of such parties where the Secretary determines that such recharacterization
is appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this title." See I.R.C. § 7701(l)
(1997).
92. See I.R.S. Notice 97-21, 1997-11 I.R.B. 9. In the example in Notice 97-21, a corpo-
rate sponsor transfers high quality debt instruments to a REIT taking back all the common
stock. The REIT issues preferred stock that is sold to foreigners or tax-exempt entities.
The cash flow on the debt is used to service the preferred stock, which carries a dividend
rate well above the market rate of interest for 10 years. After 10 years the preferred stock
stops paying dividends and it is slowly liquidated at a rate of one percent of the issue price
per year. The sponsor's interest is similar to a zero-coupon bond: it predictably rises in
value as the 10 years elapse. The Notice takes the position that the described transaction is
in reality a financing transaction. It relies on § 7701(l). See id.; I.R.C. § 7701().
93. The Notice states that eventual regulations will cover the case where (1) a conduit
entity is used; (2) an interest in the entity is "partially or fully self-amortizing," meaning
that payments that are made are expected to decrease its value; and (3) and these pay-
ments "are treated by the conduit entity as a distribution of earnings and profits or other-
wise as reducing the conduit entity's or any other taxpayer's taxable income." I.R.S.
Notice 97-21, 1997-11 I.R.B. 9.
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tion of losses erodes the value of a Class A interest while the allocation of
income shifts taxable income from Class B to Class A.
It is anyone's guess whether the government would prevail were this
issue litigated under the current statute and regulations. 94 Section 7701(l)
is directed at a different problem. 95 While that statute is broadly written,
a literal reading of it would not reach cases such as this.96 Courts do not
always side with the government when it takes positions that are not well-
grounded in the Tax Code or regulations in challenging tax-motivated
transactions. 97 However, such legal arguments may be largely beside the
point. The government may strengthen its legal position by issuing regu-
lations in support of its position. While regulations usually apply only
prospectively to transactions occurring after the regulation is issued, the
Treasury has the power to make regulations retroactive. 98 And in a few
94. The government might also try to argue that either interest is debt and not equity.
However, the little case law on debt-equity characterization in a partnership mostly involve
challenges by the government to purported debt, not purported equity. The cases are col-
lected in WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PART-
NERS I[ 3.03[3] at 3-26 to 3-27 (1990). The government lost in two cases where it argued
that a purported equity interest that carried a guaranteed return with a set yield was in
reality debt. See Lamar Hunt, 59 T.C.M. 635 (1990); Investors Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 72 T.C. 1027 (1979), affd, 677 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1982).
95. What Congress had in mind when it enacted § 7701(l) was the case where a foreign
person lent money to a United States person through a conduit entity established by the
parties in a third nation with which the United States had a tax treaty exempting interest
income from tax. The legislative history cites Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
925 (1971), as an example. For a clean example of such an arrangement, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.881-3(e), ex. 11 (as amended in 1995). FP is organized in country N, which has no tax
treaty in the U.S. FP owns 100% of the stock of FS, which is organized in country T.
Country T has a tax treaty with U.S. exempting interest; country N does not. FP makes an
interest-free demand loan of $10 million to FS. FS then lends $10 million to DS, a U.S.
borrower, on a 10-year interest bearing note.
The legislative history states that the rule has broader application. There is a statement
that the principle applies "not solely to back-to-back loan transactions, but also to other
financing transactions .... [including] multi-party transactions involving debt guarantees
or equity investments." House Report to the Revenue Reconciliation Act, H.R. REP. No.
103-111, pt. e, at 729 (1993).
96. On its face, § 7701(l) only empowers the Secretary to disregard an intermediary
entity in a financing transaction and collapse the transaction into direct financing by one
party to another. In the example in text, the statute is invoked to recharacterize a contract
between one party and the intermediary.
97. A notable example of a government defeat when it took a position weakly
grounded in the blackletter law of the Code and Regulations is Cottage Sav. Assoc. v.
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), which rejected the argument that a loss should not be
recognized on the exchange of equivalent portfolios of loans because the taxpayer's posi-
tion was supported by a literal reading of the relevant statute and regulation. Brown
Group Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996), is another notable government
defeat. The court allowed a U.S. corporation to avoid tax under Subpart F on unremitted
profits from its foreign operations by conducting those operations through a partnership.
The decision offers a striking illustration of the different reactions judges have to the IRS
as an advocate and the IRS as a writer of regulations. The court refused to close what it
conceded was a "loophole" in the law, taking the position that to do so was Congress's job.
The court did, however, note the § 701 anti-abuse regulations with approval. See id. at 222.
This suggests that the government could have strengthened its hands in the litigation by
making the anti-abuse regulations retroactive.
98. See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997), which allows Treasury to "provide that
any regulation may take effect or apply retroactively to prevent abuse." Even without such
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instances it has used that power. This power is the ultimate weapon in
the government's arsenal aimed at tax planners who exploit loopholes
and gaps in existing tax law.
There is a more subtle difference between Subchapter K and the
REMIC and FASIT system. The difference is most pronounced in
REMICs, which typically hold long-term fixed rate mortgages and issue a
series of debt instruments (or "tranches") with different maturities. The
difference results from a financial phenomenon-typically the yield curve
slopes upward, meaning that longer maturity debt bears a higher rate of
interest-and an accounting convention. By convention, interest on
fixed-rate debt is assumed to accrue at a constant rate. Because of this
phenomenon and convention, a typical REMIC will earn more interest
income in its early years than the amount it pays out. The cash flows
wash because there is an offsetting discrepancy in principal paid in and
out. Interest paid in and out equalizes over time, but a lower amount is
paid out in the early years when the shorter maturity, lower rate tranches
are being paid off.99
In a REMIC, this asymmetry in the accounting for interest paid into
and out by the pool produces what has been called "phantom income."' 100
The FASIT and REMIC rules are designed to ensure that this "phantom
income" bears tax. The rules require that there be an ownership or
residual interest in an entity so that someone bears this phantom income.
Additionally, they require that this interest be held by a tax-paying cor-
poration. Consequently, a residual interest can have negative value: a
corporation is paid to assume the interest. There are no such restrictions
in Subchapter K. A partnership can hold long-term, non-mortgage debt
and issue a series of debt instruments. In an environment with a rising
yield curve, the partnership will pay out interest at a slower rate than it
receives it. This defers income to the persons holding debt through the
partnership while producing a residue of "phantom income" to the part-
nership. If the partnership interest is held by a foreigner or a corporation
with net operating losses, then this "phantom income" will escape tax.
authority, the Treasury could achieve much the same effect as making a ruling retroactive
by applying it prospectively to transactions that were entered into prior to the ruling. This
was done in I.R.S. Notice 97-21, 1997-11 I.R.B. 9.
99. A simple example can illustrate this phenomenon. Assume a pool of three-year
notes that pay eight percent. It is carved up into three tranches with maturities of one, two,
and three years, which bear interest at rates of 7.7%, 8%, and 8.2% respectively. Over
time, equal amounts of principal and interest will be paid into and out of the pool. But in
year one, the pool will have phantom income because the interest it is deemed to earn at a
flat rate of 8% on outstanding principal will exceed the interest it pays on the three
tranches, since the pool is paying a rate of only 7.7% on some of the principal. See Kirk
Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 149 (1994) (provid-
ing a more elaborate example).
100. See id. at 211-15.
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IV. SECURITIZATION OF TAX PREFERENCE ASSETS, THE
EFFECT OF ACCOUNTING ASYMMETRIES IN THE
FASIT MODEL, AND MORE ON TAX
ALCHEMY USING PARTNERSHIPS
Under the REMIC and FASIT models, there is only a minor potential
tax advantage to slicing up debt instruments through an intermediary be-
cause most interests in the intermediary themselves take the form of debt.
This means that they will bear the tax on their expected yield however
cash flows and risks are divided. This model works best when debt instru-
ments are held through the intermediary; the income paid into and paid
out by the intermediary roughly offset. Income and deductions may not
perfectly offset-the phenomenon of "phantom income" is a case in
point-but such discrepancies are likely to be minor. Viewed in the ab-
stract, the phenomenon of phantom income results from an asymmetry in
how interest is accounted for on the pool of mortgages held by the entity
and how interest is accounted for on the debt instruments issued by the
entity. Accounting asymmetries could have profound effects if assets
other than debt instruments could be held through a FASIT or REMIC
(they cannot).
Tax preferences are an important source of asymmetry. Preferred
stock is a case in point. From an economic perspective preferred stock is
similar to debt. However, the interest-like payment is subject to a tax
preference: the dividends received deduction. 10 1 While a FASIT may not
hold preferred stock, the FASIT structure could be replicated by creating
a partnership that had a single small class of equity that issued debt in
one or more classes. Such a partnership would generate a large residue
of dividend income and unused interest deductions. This residue would
flow through to the equity owner. While the equity interest might seem
to be an attractive investment for a tax-paying corporation (the idea
would be to deduct the entire amount of the interest while shielding sev-
enty percent of the dividend income from tax with the dividend's received
deduction 10 2), the anti-arbitrage rule in section 246A, which reduces the
dividends received deduction on debt-financed stock, eliminates this tax
benefit. The equity owner is in the same position as someone who bor-
rows to invest in preferred stock.
The analysis proceeds along roughly the same lines if tax-exempt bonds
are held through a partnership with a FASIT-type capital structure. The
partnership generates a residue of tax-exempt income and interest deduc-
tions, but the anti-arbitrage rule in section 265 prevents the equity owner
101. See I.R.C. § 243 (1994).
102. Assume preferred stock with a face value of $100 that pays a dividend of 6% is
held through an intermediary that issues debt with a face value of $99 that pays 6.1%
interest. The residual dividend income would be $6 annually and the residual interest de-
duction would be $6.04. This would generate an annual tax benefit worth $1.48 to a corpo-
ration at a 35% rate (the interest deduction reduces taxes by $2.11 and the tax paid on the
dividends is $.63 (.35 * .3 * $6)).
19971
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from utilizing the interest deductions. 103 While this analysis suggests that
Treasury should not be concerned with the use of partnerships to securi-
tize tax-preference assets so long as the partnership has a FASIT-type
capital structure (i.e., the partnership has a single class of equity with all
other interests taking the form of debt), it also shows why tax planners
are not satisfied with this option, for income flowing through to the hold-
ers of debt interests loses its preferred character.
A partnership might be used to securitize preferred stock or tax-ex-
empt bonds by structuring the "pay-through" interests-i.e., the interests
that receive the dividend or interest payments as they flow through the
pool-as equity rather than debt. This possibility takes us into uncharted
legal terrain.10 4 A taste of the problems in store for the Treasury as tax
planners venture into this terrain can be had from considering how a
partnership might be used to strip dividends from preferred stock. In a
simple version of a dividend strip using a partnership, preferred stock is
held through a partnership that has two classes of interests. One class
receives all the dividends while the other class receives the payment on
liquidation or sale of the stock. 105 Call these two classes the "DO" (divi-
dend only) and "LO" (liquidation only) interests. This structure has
promising tax characteristics. The hope is that in the hands of a corpora-
tion, a DO interest will produce a stream of income that is shielded from
tax by the dividends received deduction, followed by a loss of the unre-
covered basis in the interest on liquidation. Moreover, the hope is that
the LO interest, which is similar to a zero-coupon bond, will bear de-
ferred income.
The government does not have dependable weapons in Subchapter K
to challenge this sort of arrangement. It could challenge the substantial-
ity of the allocations, but, as we have seen, introducing risk with regards
to the amount or the timing of the dividends or the liquidation payment
weakens this argument. And the substantiality test could be satisfied by
103. There is a debate about the merit of § 265 and other anti-arbitrage rules that are
keyed to debt-financed investments in tax-preference assets. For a vigorous, multi-faceted
defense of these rules, see Calvin H. Johnson, Is An Interest Deduction Inevitable?, 6 VA.
TAx REV. 123 (1986). For a critique of the rules, see William A. Klein, Borrowing to
Finance Tax-Favored Investments, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 608.
104. It is difficult to take a large publicly traded partnership down this path today.
Under SEC Rule 3a-7, an investment intermediary is subject to regulation as an investment
company, and so will be taxed as a corporation under the publicly traded partnership rules,
unless the securities it sells to the public at large are high-grade fixed income securities.
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1997).
105. As with the interest-strip, allocation of all the dividend income to the dividend
interest will create an imbalance in the capital accounts. On liquidation, a dividend inter-
est would have a positive balance in its capital account equal to its initial balance. The fast-
pay preferred stock structure shows one way to eliminate the imbalance: provide that the
preferred interest will be paid a nominal return after a set date for a prolonged period until
a pre-ordained liquidation date. See supra note 94. Alternatively, if the portfolio of pre-
ferred stock can be expected to generate losses, then the positive balance might be wiped
out using a structure in which the fast-pay interests are allocated all losses until the capital




introducing complications in the basic structure that mute the tax benefits
while accentuating the risk to a class of interests, for example, create a
third class of interests that has a right to dividends over a specified
level.10 6 As I noted in the discussion of interest stripping, the govern-
ment may have more success with the argument that this is really a con-
duit financing arrangement, though, again, it may not.
The government could also bring to bear provisions in Subchapter C
and elsewhere in the Tax Code that address related shenanigans with pre-
ferred stock. However, it will find that the interposition of a partnership
weakens these arguments. Section 305(e), which was enacted in 1993,
taxes the holder of the zero-coupon bond like interest created by strip-
ping preferred stock as if he held a zero-coupon bond.10 7 This provision
applies only to a "purchaser" of "stripped preferred stock," who is de-
fined as a person who acquires stripped stock in a transaction where their
basis in the stock is not determined by reference to the basis in the stock
of the person from whom they acquired the stock.108 A partnership that
purchases preferred stock is not a purchaser of stripped preferred stock
under this definition, and neither is a partner who holds an LO interest,
even if the partnership is considered an owner of the stock. The partner's
basis in the stock is, in part, a function of the partnership's basis in the
stock.
The government would be on slightly firmer footing in challenging the
dividends received deduction claimed by a corporate holder of a DO in-
terest. It could take the position that the preferred stock was not ever
held for the forty-five day period required by section 246(c); at all times
the holder of a DO interest is in a position similar to a person who holds
preferred stock under an obligation to sell (the holder of the LO interest
is in the position of the buyer).10 9 However, this argument is not a clear
winner either. The ultimate question here is whether a holder of pre-
ferred stock bears a risk of loss on the stock. The holder of a DO interest
bears a significantly greater risk of loss than does a person who holds
stock under an obligation to sell, because a holder of a DO interest is
exposed to the risk that dividends will not be declared for a substantial
period of time. Further, the section 246 regulations say little about risk-
shifting arrangements using partnerships.' l0
106. As it is written, the substantiality test is met if a special allocation can result in any
significant interest doing substantially worse than it would have done post-tax had the allo-
cation not been made. Thus, creating a third class of interests on top of the dividend inter-
est and the liquidation interest can satisfy the test with regards to those interests.
107. See I.R.C. § 305(e) (1994).
108. See I.R.C. § 305(e)(5)-(6) (1994) (defining "purchase").
109. See I.R.C. § 246(c)(4)(A) (1994).
110. There is only this statement in the regulations: "[A] taxpayer is treated as dimin-
ishing its risk of loss by holding substantially similar or related property if the taxpayer
holds an interest in, or is the beneficiary of, a pass-through entity, intermediary, or other




This is not an isolated problem that can be fixed with a ruling or two.
Dividend stripping is illustrative of a larger set of problems created by
basic features of tax law in general and partnership tax law in particu-
lar."1 A great many rules and principles in income tax law turn on the
concept of ownership, which increasingly is associated in tax law with risk
bearing on the thing ostensibly owned. Section 246(c) is a case in point.
It denies the dividends received deduction to a transitory owner of pre-
ferred stock and recognizes a person as an owner only if he bears a risk of
loss on the stock. The use of partnerships undermines the application of
section 246(b), and it will undermine the application of other rules and
principles that are keyed to ownership and risk, for partnerships cloud
the issue of ownership and permit unique risk tailoring. Subchapter K is
not much of an impediment to such arrangements because its rules were
designed to be flexible; while there are some constraints, the most impor-
tant of these-the substantiality test for special allocations-is indetermi-
nate and primitive.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD: THE POTENTIAL OF
ANTI-ABUSE LAW
It would be a mistake to abolish the "passive-type" income exception
to the publicly traded partnership rules for this would close Subchapter K
to publicly traded entities. It is important to keep Subchapter K open as
a tax regime for the securitization of assets that either do not qualify
under the FASIT rules or that cannot economically be securitized under
the FASIT rules because those rules would strip them of their preference
income. Indeed, an argument can be made for expanding the scope of
the exception to cover some assets that now are excluded, in particular
insurance contracts. In the short-run, the government will have no choice
but to address the use of partnerships as passive financial intermediaries
through the growing web of anti-abuse law. These include the substanti-
ality test in the section 704(b) regulations, 112 the general anti-abuse rule
in the section 701 regulations, 13 and the rules being developed under the
"conduit financing arrangement" principle of section 7701().114 In this
section, I examine how far the government might go using this evolving
body of law.
111. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50
TAX L. REV. 643 (1995). Use of a partnership also assists in exploiting tax law's penchant
for "cubby-holing" investments to determine their tax consequences. For an explanation
of cubby-holing. See Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabilities-Integration or
Bifurcation of Financial Products, 68 TAXES 1003, 1007 (1990). See also Edward
Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance
System, 67 TAXES 943, 947-48 (1989).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1997).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995).
114. See I.R.C. § 7701(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-2, 61 Fed. Reg. 68175 (1996).
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A. THE NECESSITY AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIALITY
The substantiality test in the section 704(b) regulations runs into a
problem at a deeper level than do most other "substance over form" prin-
ciples. A comparison of the substantiality test with the "constructive
sale" principle illustrates the point. People disagree on where to draw the
line in defining a "constructive sale."' 115 Enforcing a constructive sale
principle is difficult because of line-drawing and monitoring problems,
but at a deeper level most people who are knowledgeable about tax
would accept the basic premise behind the principle, which is that some
arrangements are so substantively similar to a sale that they should be
taxed as such notwithstanding their form. The constructive sale principle
works at this deep level because of a common understanding that there is
a thing called a sale that has certain identifiable economic characteristics
and that should bear certain tax consequences.
The substantiality test in section 704(b) does not work at this deep
level. Satisfying the substantiality test means that allocations in a part-
nership agreement will be respected for tax purposes, which means that
tax consequences of the parties arrangement will follow from the applica-
tion of the rules in Subchapter K. However, this does not make us confi-
dent that we are taxing their arrangement properly, in the same way we
are confident that we are taxing an arrangement properly as a sale when
it has the substantive elements of a sale. The fundamental reason is that
while we have vague ideas of certain arrangements that are within the
concept of partnership where the rules in Subchapter K measure income
pretty well (the proverbial "mom and pop partnership" comes to mind as
an example), because of the breadth and vagueness of the concept of a
partnership there are many arrangements that come within this concept
where we expect that the rules in Subchapter K do not measure the part-
ners' income particularly well.
While passing the substantiality test should not be sufficient to bring an
arrangement under the rules in Subchapter K, it should not be a neces-
sary condition for respecting allocations. One justification for the sub-
stantiality test is that in a "normal" partnership income and loss are
shared pro rata. Deviations from this norm are allowed, but only if they
have economic substance. I would justify the test in a somewhat different
way that takes account of the "plasticity" of the partnership form. We
realize that given the plasticity of the partnership form, people often can
achieve their economic goals using a partnership through a variety of ar-
rangements that have different tax consequences. This thought is troub-
ling because we expect that people will select the partnership
arrangement that bears the least aggregate tax. To limit this discretion,
115. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 9512, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 20,
1996; Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal,
50 TAX L. REV. 571, 641 (1995) (describing constructive sale rules proposed by the Treas-
ury and an alternative proposal by Professor Schenk).
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we require that there be an economic justification for variations from
some baseline. The chosen baseline (pro rata allocations) has the virtues
of simplicity and familiarity, and it may even be the baseline from which
most people start in structuring partnerships.
B. WHEN DOES IT VIOLATE THE "INTENT OF SUBCHAPTER K" To
USE PARTNERSHIPS To CIRCUMVENT RULES OUTSIDE OF
SUBCHAPTER K?
My argument that passing the substantiality test should not be suffi-
cient to justify applying Subchapter K to an arrangement is grounded on
the provocative claim that there are a significant number of economic
arrangements where applying the rules in Subchapter K produces the
wrong tax result. This is a provocative claim, for it presupposes a theory
explaining why a result is wrong. Such a theory cannot be derived from
Subchapter K itself, and while we might appeal to broad principles of
good tax policy, such as the principle "taxable income should equal eco-
nomic income," those principles are mostly aspirational and so are not
that helpful as guides. In this section, I suggest a more modest basis for
condemning certain results under Subchapter K: we suspect a result is
wrong when a partnership is used to circumvent tax rules contained
outside Subchapter K or to achieve tax results that could not be achieved
were the same thing done not using a partnership entity.
Subchapter K is particularly susceptible to the argument that it should
not be used to circumvent other tax rules because its rules are often justi-
fied on the ground that they enable people to do through a partnership
what they could also do outside of a partnership. For example, the rule
allowing special allocations was originally justified in this way, 1 6 and so
too was the rule giving partners outside basis for partnership nonrecourse
debt." 7 This justification leaves off when a partnership is used to circum-
vent tax rules outside of Subchapter K. And it weakens when a partner-
ship is used to do things that cannot be done outside of a partnership.
Much of existing anti-abuse law is best understood as a measure to
prevent the use of partnerships to circumvent tax rules outside of Sub-
chapter K. Sections 707(a)(2)(A) and (B), which were enacted in 1984,
have this character. They are aimed at "disguised sales" and the like, and
were expressly justified on the ground that partnerships should not be
used to "circumvent the requirement to capitalize certain expenses and
other rules and restrictions concerning various expenses" or to achieve
"tax free treatment in cases which are economically indistinguishable
from sales."' 1 8 One of the targets of the general anti-abuse regulation in
116. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A223-24 (1954); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 379 (1954)
(giving as examples of valid allocations the allocation of foreign source income to a foreign
partner and the allocation of income from separate assets to different partners).
117. See Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K Proposals on the Taxation of Part-
ners 231-32 (Am. Law Inst. 1984).
118. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-861, at 233 (1984).
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section 701, as that regulation was first proposed, was transactions using
"partnerships to avoid the purposes of other provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code." 119 This target is not stated explicitly in the final regula-
tions, but it is implicit in the first factor said to bear on the abusiveness of
a partnership transaction: whether the partners would have had a greater
tax liability had they done whatever they did outside of Subchapter K.120
And a concern with the use of partnerships to avoid other tax rules is at
the heart of the second part of the anti-abuse regulations, which allows
the Commissioner to look through a partnership, treating a partner as if
he owned partnership assets directly, "to carry out the purpose of any
provision of the Internal Revenue Code."12'
The deep problem presented by this sort of anti-abuse rule (there is
also a line-drawing and monitoring problem) is determining when it is
improper to use a partnership to circumvent tax rules outside of Sub-
chapter K. It is not always improper; for instance, the anti-abuse regula-
tions say that a partnership may properly be used to avoid the corporate
tax. 122 Section 701 regulations say that this is so because "Subchapter K
is intended to permit taxpayers to conduct joint business activity ... with-
out incurring an entity-level tax."'1 23 However, this merely states the con-
clusion. How are we to go about determining the "intent of Subchapter
K" in other cases?
The practical answer to this question is that Treasury will tell us; and
some questions are sufficiently open to debate that whatever Treasury
says goes. For example, Treasury could (and probably should) proclaim
that it was not "the intent of Subchapter K" to allow partnerships to be
used to evade the rules on dividend stripping. Such a pronouncement
would go part of the way towards addressing the problems raised in Part
IV. I have no doubt that a court would uphold such a regulation.
A more interesting question that goes to the limits of the Treasury's
power is whether the Treasury could proclaim that it violates the "intent
of Subchapter K" to use a partnership to circumvent the FASIT rules.
Such a proclamation would go a long way towards addressing the
problems discussed in Part III. One difficulty with such a pronouncement
is that it would be legally unsound. It is inconsistent with the publicly
traded partnership rules, which allow debt instruments to be held through
a publicly traded partnership that is taxed under Subchapter K. 124 It is
119. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581 (1994). This was one of two
targeted uses of partnerships. The other was "transactions using partnerships to achieve
tax results that are inconsistent with the underlying economic arrangements of the parties
or the substance of the transactions .... Id.
120. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1995) (a defining factor bearing on
the abusiveness of a partnership arrangement whether "[t]he present value of the partners"
aggregate federal tax liability is substantially less than had the partners owned the partner-
ship's assets and conducted the partnership's activities directly).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1995).
122. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 1(i) (as amended in 1995).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.701(d), ex. 1(ii) (as amended in 1995).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 7704(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1997).
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also inconsistent with Congress's apparent intent in enacting the FASIT
rules. Congress chose to not make the FASIT rules exclusive knowing
that partnerships were being used to securitize debt instruments.
Such a pronouncement would be unwise as well as of dubious legality
because of the line-drawing problem. A line drawing problem is inherent
in any anti-abuse rule that taxes one thing because it is like something
else, but the problem in this case is of a different order. The decision to
make the FASIT rules exclusive raises a host of difficult policy questions.
What, for example, should be done about tax-exempt bonds? And can a
partnership be used as a vehicle for securitizing ordinary debt instru-
ments with market discount (the FASIT rules would strip the tax benefits
for market-discount bonds held through a FASIT 125)? It is better not to
try to address difficult questions like these through the framework of an
anti-abuse rule because, by necessity, anti-abuse rules are vaguely drawn.
Questions that raise important policy questions will go unasked and
unanswered.
C. FORMULATING MIDDLE RANGE "INVIOLABLE" TAX PRINCIPLES
I have yet to discuss the most controversial parts of anti-abuse law
under the section 701 regulations and under section 7701(l). These parts
of the law consist of examples of specific transactions that are deemed to
be abusive, a few general principles that are said to underpin these rul-
ings, and a set of factors that purport to explain how the principles are
applied. The deep problem in this body of law lies in the gap between the
decisions in the specific cases and the general principles and factors.
While the cases seem rightly decided the stated principles and factors do
not really explain the decisions because they are too broad-there are
too many counter-examples in tax law where outcomes that violate the
principles and that exhibit the factors are countenanced. This gap opens
the anti-abuse rules to the valid criticism that the government is over-
reaching, 126 and, perversely, it diminishes the effectiveness of anti-abuse
law because a natural reaction is to interpret the law as case specific. This
part of anti-abuse law also is open to criticism and is of diminished effec-
tiveness because of the fact that in these cases the government is oppos-
ing positions that are well-grounded on the literal language of the Code
with weak statutory authority on behalf of its own position. Strengthen-
ing this part of anti-abuse law requires tightening the law. What is
needed are middle range principles that explain the specific decisions and
125. Under current law, market-discount bonds held through a REMIC or a FASIT are
stripped of this preference because the market discount is "included in gross income for
the taxable years to which it is attributable." I.R.C. § 860C(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997);
see also I.R.C. § 860H(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
126. See e.g., William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The Effect of Substance Over
Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose Considerations On the Proper Interpretation
of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641, 658 (1995); Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-




that command general respect. The rulings under section 7701(l) are a
step in this direction for they state more limited principles than do the
section 701 regulations. Still, there are complaints from the bar that these
principles sweep too far."27 A consequence of this tightening of anti-
abuse law is that there will be some troubling cases that anti-abuse law
cannot reach.
Example 7 of the section 701 regulations is a good illustration of a
transaction that most now would consider abusive. 128 The case has many
elements in common with the transaction that was held to be abusive by
the Tax Court in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,129 and it also has
many elements in common with the transaction that was held to be abu-
sive in the "anti-stripping" ruling and regulations. 130 A partnership is
formed by a foreign corporation, a domestic corporation, and a promoter,
which contribute $9,000, $990, and $10, respectively. The partnership
uses this money to buy offshore equipment, which it proceeds to lease out
under a long-term lease. Next it sells the right to the future leasehold
income for $9,000, which is income under the rule on prepayments and is
allocated among the partners pro rata ($8,100, $891, and $9 respectively).
Then the foreign corporation liquidates its interest for $9,000. Because a
section 754 election is not made, the partnership is left with equipment
with an inside basis of $10,000 (its cost), though the combined outside
basis of the domestic corporation and the promoter is only $1,890 at this
point. The partnership borrows $8,000 and buys an asset to increase its
outside basis. Finally, it sells the equipment subject to the lease for
127. See Richard M. Lipton, "Obligation-Shifting" Proposed Regulations-Is Deemed
Loan Treatment the Right Approach, 86 J. TAX'N 209 (1997).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 7 (as amended in 1995).
129. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M.(CCH) 2189 (1997). The Tax
Court's decision in ACM Partnership stands for the proposition that if a tortuous route is
taken to get from one point to another solely for the tax benefits that lay along the more
difficult route a court may disregard the route that was taken and place the transaction on
a different route. This principle is akin to one formulation of the step-transaction doctrine,
the so-called "end result test," wherein "purportedly separate transactions will be amalga-
mated with a single transaction when it appears that they were really component parts of a
single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the
ultimate result." McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir.
1982) (quoting King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
ACM Partnership adds an important gloss to this principle: the route taken will be disre-
garded if the additional transaction cost of taking that route exceeded any reasonably pos-
sible additional profit.
The obvious objection to this principle is that it is wildly overbroad. Taxpayers regularly
incur additional transaction costs to structure investments in tax-advantaged forms. Using
insurance as an investment vehicle is a common example. Two related factors mentioned
in ACM Partnership narrow the principle somewhat, though both are very indeterminate.
One factor might be called legislative intent: sometimes Congress endorses cumbersome
tax-saving strategies. Equipment-leasing in the early 1980s is an example. The other factor
is custom. Commonplace cumbersome tax-saving strategies are immune from challenge on
this ground. Using insurance as an investment vehicle is distinguishable on the second
ground; it may be distinguishable on the first.
130. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-2, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,175, 68,179 (1996); I.R.S. No-
tice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334.
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$1,000, realizing a $9,000 loss that is allocated to the two partners. Gen-
erating this artificial loss was the point of the transaction.
The section 701 regulations do a poor job of explaining precisely what
makes this transaction abusive. The outcome violates the general princi-
ple stated in the regulations-the outcome does not "clearly reflect the
partner's income"' 31-but so too do many other outcomes under Sub-
chapter K for it is a realization-based system and not an accretion-based
system. The regulations purport to limit this principle by stating that out-
comes that do not clearly reflect income are not tolerated when they are a
byproduct of the application of rules that were adopted for "administra-
tive convenience and other policy objectives" and the outcome was not
"clearly contemplated" by the rule.132 This statement has about the same
content as the aphorism "pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered." Both state-
ments in this context mean do not push tax law too far.
What guidance there is in the regulations on what is too "swinish" is
found in a list of factors that are said to bear on the determination
"[wihether a partnership was formed or availed of with a principal pur-
pose to reduce substantially the present value of the partners' aggregate
federal tax liability in a manner inconsistent with the intent of Subchapter
K."1 33 These factors include: (1) the fact that the partners' aggregate
federal tax liability is substantially less than it otherwise would have
been; 34 (2) the fact that transaction has a step or steps with little eco-
nomic significance but that generates substantial tax savings (such as in-
terest of the foreign corporation's role and the dealings with the
equipment in example 7);135 (3) the fact that a partner has a nominal or
risk-free interest (such as the foreign corporation in example 7);136 and
(4) the fact that a partner is effectively exempt from tax (yet another
factor bearing on the perfidy of the role of the foreign corporation in
example 7).137
This list of factors narrows the principle somewhat but it remains over-
broad. A testament to this effect can be found in the section 704(b) regu-
lations since the same factors that were present in example 7 of the
section 701 regulations can be present in what is plainly meant to be a
valid special allocation.138 Example 2 in the section 704(b) regulations 139
involves disproportionate allocations of depreciation deductions from
debt-financed equipment with a gain chargeback. 140 Add two facts to ex-
ample 2-the equipment is leased out under a long-term lease for its en-
tire useful life to a lessee with a gilt-edged credit rating and the partners
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995).
132. Id.
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c) (as amended in 1995).
134. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1995).
135. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1995).
136. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1995).
137. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(5) (as amended in 1995).
138. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-(1)(b) (as amended in 1994).
139. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 2 (as amended in 1994).
140. See id.
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come from different tax clienteles (the partner who gets the depreciation
deductions values them while the other one is tax exempt)-and all the
factors that were present in example 9 are present in example 2. But it is
clear that the addition of these facts should not change the outcome in
example 2 because the conclusion that this arrangement has economic
effect flows from an irrebuttable presumption in the section 704(b) regu-
lations that the value of the equipment equals its basis. 14' Example 8 in
the section 701 regulations 142 describes a case that is similar to example 2
in the section 704(b) regulations with the additional damning facts. The
explanation is that this outcome was "clearly contemplated" by the
"value equals basis safe-harbor.' 43 This is a conclusion masquerading as
reasoning.
The Treasury took another crack at example 7 in the anti-stripping rul-
ing and regulation and came up with a more limited principle. 144 The
regulation is directed at "obligation-shifting transactions" in which one
party assumes the obligation of another to provide property or services in
the future under a lease or similar agreement where the other party has
already been paid to provide that property or those services.' 45 Putting it
differently (and a little more broadly), the regulation aims at transactions
that result in different taxpayers bearing income and the expense associ-
ated with producing that income. Example 7 is covered by the regulation
because the corporate partner and the promoter assume the foreign part-
ner's obligation to provide the offshore equipment under the lease while
the foreign partner has already been paid the future rents. There are
complaints that the anti-stripping regulation is too broad. Richard Lipton
has observed that it might apply to "[a]ny sale of property that occurs
after rent prepayments" 146-but the class of cases it covers is much nar-
rower than that covered by the section 701 regulations. This principle can
be even further limited by adding some of the factors from the section
701 regulations, such as the fact that the separation of income and ex-
pense makes the parties better off in the aggregate because they are in
different tax clienteles.
In the ruling on step-down preferred stock, Treasury also was able to
define the abuse in reasonably narrow terms.' 47 The ruling addresses a
REIT transaction with two classes of interests where one class of interest
is paid all of the income flowing through the REIT for a period of years
and thereafter is paid a very low yield. The effect is to defer income to
the other class because dividends paid by a REIT are deductible. The
first class is sold to tax-exempt investors who are indifferent to the extra
141. See Gergen, supra note 16, at 16-17 (explaining this point).
142. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 6 (as amended in 1995).
143. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (as amended in 1995).
144. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-2, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,175, 68,179 (1996); I.R.S. No-
tice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334.
145. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-2(h)(1), 61 Fed. Reg. 68,175, 68,181 (1996).
146. Lipton, supra note 127, at 211.
147. See I.R.S. Notice 97-21, 1997-11 I.R.B. 29. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-4(a)(4), ex. 2.
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income. Earlier I gave an example of a partnership transaction that ac-
complished the same result.148 One could challenge this transaction
under the section 701 regulations (the outcome does not "clearly reflect
the income" of the partners, it reduces taxes, due to the nature of the
assets held by the REIT the economic risk borne is small in relation to
the tax benefits, and one party is tax-exempt), but the ruling is narrower.
It targets tax-saving transactions where one party has what it is called a
"self-amortizing interest," meaning that the interest is expected to shrink
in value, and income is shifted to that party from another party. Putting
it differently (and a little more broadly), the ruling aims at transactions
where a payment that in reality represents the recovery by a party of an
investment is cast as income to that party in order to divert income from
another party.
These are workable anti-abuse principles because they are sufficiently
limited in scope that there are relatively few cases with the defined fea-
tures where it is undesirable for tax planners to worry about the position
they are taking. If over-breadth remains a problem, then the principles
can be further limited by adding elements from the section 701 regula-
tions to identify the cases that are likely to be problematic from a tax
perspective. In particular, the principles might be limited to cases where
the arrangement results in a substantial tax savings to the parties.
A consequence of reworking anti-abuse law along these lines is that
there will be some troubling cases that the law does not reach. For exam-
ple, a partnership is formed to acquire tax-exempt bonds with market
discount. Market discount on tax-exempt bonds is taxed as ordinary in-
come on maturity or sale of the bonds.149 This feature of tax law presum-
ably hampers secondary markets in tax-exempt bonds because the
optimal clientele for the exempt stream of income, persons who pay tax
at the top marginal rate, may not be same as the optimal clientele for
bonds that yield deferred taxable ordinary income.' 50 The partnership is
used to distill out these two streams of income using two classes of inter-
est. One class is allocated the tax-exempt interest, the other class is allo-
cated the market discount.
The Treasury could challenge this arrangement under the existing sec-
tion 701 regulations. The outcome does not "clearly reflect the income"
of the second class of investors for their interests predictably bear de-
ferred income.' 5 ' The investors will pay less aggregate tax if different tax
clienteles invest in the two classes.1 52 The same outcome could not be
148. See supra note 99.
149. See I.R.C. § 1276 (West Supp. 1997).
150. See Arthur M. Miller, Memorandum on Secondary Market Bond Securitization,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, May 24, 1993, on treatment of market discount. Miller states "such a
hybrid security would be virtually unknown in the municipal area, and would not be attrac-
tive to investors. Some of the largest purchasers of tax-exempt obligations are mutual
funds that in many cases are not permitted, as a matter of investment policy, to earn any
taxable interest income." Id.
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (as amended in 1995).
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achieved if the investors held the bonds directly, 153 and if the bonds are
high grade, then no one investor bears much risk.154 But once one con-
cedes that the heart of the regulation is the examples, and its "soul" are
the "middle range" principles that might plausibly be extrapolated from
these examples, then this arrangement is not open to challenge under
anti-abuse law. It does not violate either of the "middle range" principles
in the section 7701() rulings, nor does it involve the use of a partnership
to create artificial losses,155 to duplicate losses, 156 to distort basis, 157 or to
artificially suppress the value of an asset, 58 which are the abuses targeted
by the examples in the section 701 regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limitations on what the Treasury can do within the existing frame-
work of partnership tax law point, finally, to the need to develop alterna-
tive bodies of rules to govern passive financial intermediaries. An
immediate need is for rules to govern vehicles used to securitize debt-like
instruments that yield tax preference income, such as tax-exempt bonds
and preferred stock. Legislation has been proposed that would permit
the securitization of tax-exempt bonds.159 Whatever the technical flaws
153. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1995).
154. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1995).
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 9 (as amended in 1995).
156. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 10 (as amended in 1995).
157. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 13 (as amended in 1995).
158. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 6 (as amended in 1995).
159. See JOINT COMMITT-EE ON TAXATION STAFF, 104TH CONG. STAFF DESCRIPTION
OF MISCELLANEOUS TAX PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR HEARINGS ON JULY 11-13 BEFORE
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 229 (Joint Comm. Print 1995). A draft of an
earlier version of the legislation with an explanation from Arthur M. Miller of Goldman
Sachs can be found at supra note 150. The proposed rules bear the acronym TEMIC. Like
a REMIC, a TEMIC would have regular interests and one class of residual interests. As in
a REMIC, income would accrue on regular interests under the rules that apply to debt
instruments, i.e., income would accrue on an expected yield basis. The key to the TEMIC
structure is that some of this income would be designated as tax-exempt interest. This
feature allows the tax-exempt income to flow through to the regular interests. The tax-
exempt income from each period would be allocated among the regular interests according
to a fixed schedule. If the pool had excess tax-exempt income, then the excess would carry
forward. Regular interest income that was unshielded by tax-exempt income flowing
through the pool would be treated as interest paid by the pool. Such an amount would be
ordinary income to the regular interest holder and an expense to the pool. The deduction
would flow through to the residual interest holder.
The proposed TEMIC rules would allow tax exempt income to be allocated among regu-
lar interests in any manner, so long as the allocation follows a fixed schedule. This feature
of the rules is meant to allow the separation of tax-exempt income and market discount on
tax-exempt bonds with market discount. However, the rules would strip the tax benefit
from the market discount through two rules. First, following the REMIC rule, the market
discount would be converted into OID income to the vehicle, § 860(b)(1)(B), which would
be netted out at the entity level by the OID accruing on the regular interests. Second, the
holder of a regular interest that bore taxable interest income would not be allowed to use
NOLs to shield that income from taxation and could not be a tax-exempt entity.
The proposed TEMIC rules would not allow tax-exempt income to be allocated to the
residual interest. Were the rule otherwise, a TEMIC could be used to circumvent the anti-
arbitrage rule in § 265. The TEMIC would issue regular interests paying taxable interest
and allocate the tax-exempt interest to the residual interest. The residual interest would
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in this legislation, they are of a far lesser order of magnitude than the
existing flaws in Subchapter K. Admittedly, the proliferation of rule sys-
tems is not an attractive solution. Today we have two general rule sys-
tems for "flow-through" passive investment intermediaries (Subchapter
K and the trust rules) and three special rule systems (the REIT, REMIC
and FASIT rules). In ten years time we may add rule systems for in-
termediaries holding tax-exempt bonds, preferred stock, common stock,
and insurance contracts. However, this proliferation of rule systems
seems inevitable because a rule system that works passably well for one
type of asset is likely to be unsuitable for other types of assets.
In designing these alternative rule systems, a hidden cost to imposing
restrictions on the nature of the assets that they may hold or on the na-
ture of their capital structure should be kept in mind. Such restrictions
can become a strait-jacket on innovation if a rule system is made the ex-
clusive legal regime for holding certain types of assets without incurring
an entity-level tax on the intermediary, as was done with the REMIC
rules. Making a system optional solves that problem, but it creates an-
other problem by making it possible for people to circumvent the rules by
using an entity that is taxed as a partnership. The latter problem creates
the need for anti-abuse rules, which can cause undue uncertainty in tax
planning. While there is no perfect solution to these dilemmas, there are
some things that can be done to minimize these tradeoffs. For example,
unnecessary restrictions on assets, ownership, and capital structure
should be avoided in designing an alternative rule system to lessen the
pressure to go outside that system to Subchapter K. The objectives of
these systems should be identified so that anti-abuse rules can be tailored
to address the use of partnerships to frustrate those objectives.
end up generating tax-exempt income and an interest deduction. The tax-arbitrage possi-
bility could also have been addressed by applying § 265 to bar the deduction for interest
paid to a regular interest. This option was rejected because it would subject market dis-
count to double taxation. See generally Miller, supra note 150.
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